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Executive Summary 
 
Verité carried out research on the presence of indicators of forced labor in the 
production of ten goods in seven countries from 2008 through 2011. Research was 
carried out on the production of shrimp in Bangladesh; Brazil-nuts, cattle, corn, and 
peanuts in Bolivia; sugar in the Dominican Republic; coffee in Guatemala; fish in 
Indonesia; rubber in Liberia; and tuna in the Philippines. The following report is based 
on research on the presence of indicators of forced labor in certain types of fishing in 
Indonesia. This research was not intended to determine the existence or scale of forced 
labor in the countries and sectors under study, but rather to identify the presence of 
indicators of forced labor and factors that increased workers‘ vulnerability to labor 
exploitation. 
 
Objectives 
 
The primary objectives of the project were to: 
 obtain background information on certain areas of the fishing sector in Indonesia; 
 create a methodology to study the presence of indicators of  forced labor in some 
areas of the Indonesian fishing sector; 
 identify and document indicators of forced labor among workers in the 
Indonesian fishing sector; 
 document the broader working conditions that workers in the fishing sector 
experience; and 
 determine the risk factors for vulnerability to forced labor and other forms of 
exploitation in the particular areas of the Indonesian fishing sector.  
 
Context 
 
In order to gain an understanding of the social, economic, labor market, and cultural 
context of the fishing sector in Indonesia, background research was carried out through 
a comprehensive literature and legal review and expert consultations.  
 
Fishing plays a large role in the Indonesian economy; over 6.2 million people are 
involved in fishing activities in Indonesia and fishing exports earned the country over 
USD 2.66 billion in 2010.1 Several aspects of Indonesian fishing activity have earned 
significant international attention, including jermal (platform) fishing, as well as illegal 
fishing. With the exception of international attention paid to forced child labor on jermals, 
little previous research had been conducted specifically on the indicators of forced labor 
in these sectors.  
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Indonesia Snapshot 
Population: 248,216,193 - July 2012 estimated. (CIA Factbook) 
Labor force: 117 million (CIA Factbook) 
Labor composition: agriculture (38.3 percent); industry (46 percent); services (39.1 
percent) (CIA Factbook) 
GDP: $834.3 billion (CIA Factbook) 
Top exports: oil and gas, electrical appliances, plywood, textiles, rubber 
United Nations Human Development Index: Rank of 124 out of 179 (United Nations 
Human Development Index. 2011.) 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index: Score of 2.8, rank of 110, 
comparable with Kosovo, Benin, Bolivia and Gabon. (Transparency International, 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2011.) 
 
  
Research Methodology and Limitations 
 
Verité‘s research in Indonesia initially aimed to assess the circumstances surrounding 
forced labor on fishing platforms (jermals) in North Sumatra province. This research was 
subsequently expanded to examine small-boat anchovy fishing in North Sumatra, and 
blast fishing in South Sulawesi province 
 
Researchers did not presuppose forced labor, but instead designed surveys to probe for 
the existence of indicators of forced labor as well as other exploitative conditions. The 
research design used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (non-
probability sampling). Quantitative data was gathered via surveys using both 
convenience and snowball sampling to select respondents. Therefore, the quantitative 
findings from this study are biased by the use of nonprobability sampling. The 
quantitative portion of the research was not meant to be statistically representative at 
the national or sectoral level, but to offer trends, analysis, and insight into conditions 
facing workers in the sectors studied. 
 
Qualitative data was gathered through including more informal semi-structured 
interviews with workers and stakeholders, worksite observation, focus groups and case 
studies. The qualitative findings were used to add greater detail to the quantitative 
findings, and to triangulate quantitative findings. 
 
The research was timed to coincide with peak, middle, and low seasons of fishing 
activity.   
 
Initial research included a review of previous research, laws and policies; and 
identification of, and contact with, stakeholders and key informants to clarify 
methodology.  
 
The first round of field research took place from September 2010 to January 2011. 
During this round, researchers observed and interviewed jermal workers, blast fishers, 
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and small-boat fishers. Community members and other local stakeholders were also 
interviewed. A second round of field research was conducted from April through August 
of 2011. During this second round, more targeted research was performed, to follow up 
on trends and questions elicited from the first round of research. Case studies and focus 
group discussions were held at this time. A final round of expert consultations was held 
in early 2012 to validate research findings.  
 
Findings Summary 
 
Verité investigated the presence of indicators of forced labor among workers engaged in 
jermals, blast fishing, and small-boat fishing using International Labor Organization 
(ILO) guidance titled, ―Identifying Forced Labor in Practice‖, which was published by the 
Special Action Program on Forced Labor in a 2005 report, A Global Alliance Against 
Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-Up to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
 
The research also sought to clarify the presence of exploitative practices that, while not 
rising to the technical level of forced labor, nonetheless denote labor rights violations. 
Verité sought additionally to shed light on the demographics of workers involved in 
these sectors.  
 
Jermals 
 
Although the number of jermals has declined dramatically over the past decade, there 
are still workers who face indicators of forced labor on jermals. While on the jermal, with 
little possibility of escape, workers are subject to harsh conditions and physical and 
verbal abuse from supervisors, which is used to force workers to work harder and 
longer hours. Hours are excessively long and workers are engaged day and night. 
Workers are dependent on the jermal supervisor for their bleak housing on the platform 
itself and meager food rations. These conditions strongly indicate work and life under 
duress. Specifically, among current workers, Verité research found indicators of:  
 
 
 Forced and Excessive Overtime, Forced to Work On Call. The work on jermals is 
labor intensive, and during tidal periods, workers may be required to work up to 
20 hours per day, with only short breaks to rest. Workers are required to work 
seven days per week for the three month periods when workers are on jermals, 
with no rest days. 
 
 Limited Freedom of Movement and Communication, Constant Supervision, 
Isolation. Once workers are physically on a jermal, they have little opportunity to 
terminate employment within the first three months. The geographically isolated 
nature of jermals is a key factor in jermal workers‘ vulnerability to forced labor, 
and workers are cut off from virtually all communication with the outside world. 
This isolation, compounded by constant scrutiny from supervisors, constitutes 
strong indicators of impossibility of leaving the employer.  
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 Degrading Living Conditions. Workers live and work on jermals. The space is 
cramped, with no privacy or comfort. Food and fresh water are scarce. Sleeping 
quarters are primitive and partially exposed to the elements. There are no 
separate sleeping quarters, workers sleep on thin mats wherever they can find 
space.  
 
 Hazardous Work. The physical structure of jermals presents numerous health 
and safety dangers. First, the structures are at the mercy of sea conditions, 
including waves and storms. Sharks are common in the waters around jermals 
and may present a hazard to workers who fall in. The intensive nature of the 
work presents the possibility for repetitive stress injuries. Workers have limited 
access to food, fresh water, or medical attention. 
 
 Physical and Verbal Abuse and Harassment. Workers are isolated and live with 
the jermal boss and have no access to grievance mechanisms. Interviews with 
former workers detailed extensive verbal and physical abuse, and due to the 
isolation and constant scrutiny that workers continue to endure, it is reasonable 
to believe that they face the same conditions. 
 
 Withholding of Wages; Coercive Pay Structure. Pay is not received until the end 
of a three month term. On top of the physical isolation, this means that even if 
workers were to find a way to escape, they would not be paid unless the entire 
three month term is completed. Although this system was primarily described by 
former jermal workers, it is reasonable to believe that this system is ongoing.  
 
 Exploitation of Workers with Mental Disabilities. During interviews with families of 
workers, researchers determined that there is some incidence (although it may 
be isolated) of adults with mental disabilities being trafficked to jermals. 
 
Small-Boat Anchovy Fishing 
 
Anchovy boat fishers in North Sumatra are involved in a traditional fishing system in 
which power is concentrated with boat owners and their admirals. Fishers must maintain 
good relationships with these powerful individuals to maintain the right to continue 
fishing with them. To some degree, workers are mobile and have the ability to leave a 
―bad‖ admiral or boat owner. However, the overarching concern is the ability to maintain 
a viable livelihood, and that may mean accepting less than ideal working conditions.  
 
Poor working conditions, including long hours for low pay, are somewhat standard in the 
fishing sector in Indonesia; and the terms of employment are generally well-understood. 
Areas of particular concern include the presence of hazardous child labor, hazardous 
adult labor, opaque lending practices between boat admirals and their workers, and 
excessive hours of work.  
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 Debt: Most adult workers and some child workers interviewed reported taking 
loans from their boat admiral in order to cover income gaps. While fishers often 
have alternate sources for loans, taking loans from the admiral is considered 
preferable as these loans are seen as ―advances on payment‖ and interest is not 
charged. These loans are generally for a relatively small amount and do not 
effectively bind the workers to the admiral, although they do reinforce 
dependency on the admiral and a hierarchical, patronage-like relationship. 
 
 Excessive Hours: Workers on both long and short trip boats reported that 
working hours during trips were approximately 12 to15 hours per day.  
 
 Hazardous Child Labor: Children were identified working on boats and in related 
sectors such as anchovy workshops. One hundred and twelve child workers 
ranging from ages nine to 17 were identified working in the anchovy sector, 
approximately seven of whom worked directly on boats. Due to the long hours 
and hazardous nature of fishing – which, without question, stand to harm the 
health and safety of the children concerned – this work can be considered a 
worst form of child labor for workers under the age of 18.2 
 
 Hazardous Work: All workers, including children and adults, reported severe 
health and safety concerns including live threatening waves and storms, and 
serious injury from machinery on the boats. 
 
 Low Wages and Exploitive Pay Structures: Workers reported earning an average 
of approximately 30,000 – 35,000 IDR (3.34 – 3.89 USD) per day of fishing. 
While regular fishers are paid by the day, higher status workers such as admirals 
are paid on a bonus system, depending on the volume of the catch. This means 
that the admirals are incentivized to induce the fishers to work harder and longer, 
but the fishers themselves will not share in the reward of a higher volume catch. 
On the other hand, if a trip is unsuccessful and no fish (or a low volume of fish) 
are caught, the workers may not receive their daily payment, meaning that they 
have a higher burden of risk without the possibility of higher reward.  
 
 Lack of Contracts or Benefits: Employment is informal. Workers lack contracts 
and any benefits (such as money to cover medical bills from injuries sustained 
while fishing) are given at the discretion of the admiral or boat owner.  
 
 Limited Freedom of Movement and Communication: Limited freedom of 
movement and communication are inherent to boat fishing, but nonetheless, and 
even when consented to by the worker, create a vulnerability to severe and 
unanticipated forms of exploitation.  
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Blast Fishing 
 
Fishers involved in blast fishing (or sawi) participate in a system that resembles a 
traditional patronage relationship, in which a powerful individual (in this case known as a 
juragang) provides access to capital and livelihoods. Blast fishing is illegal, which 
means that blast fishers are de facto participating in an illicit activity and therefore may 
be vulnerable to arrest or extortion. Blast fishing is also dangerous, as explosives are 
used to capture fish. Child labor appears to be common, with children undertaking some 
of the most dangerous jobs such as diving for fish.  
 
 Induced indebtedness: Eighty-five percent of sawi reported that they were 
indebted to their juragang. Culturally, loans are seen as advance payment rather 
than debt, and no formal record of the debt is kept.  
 
 Pre-existence of dependency relationship with employer: Sawi dependence on 
their juragang goes beyond debt – juragang are the center of the island 
communities, and much of a sawi‘s identity within the community is tied to the 
juragang for whom he works. Most sawi do not have direct access to materials 
for blast fishing, and instead rely on the juragang‘s networks to procure these 
contraband materials.  
 
 Child Labor: Twenty-six children participating in blast fishing were identified and 
interviewed. These children reported using explosives, performing free dives and 
dives with air compressors, and generalized exposure to the ocean and ocean 
creatures. These factors make blast fishing a hazardous activity, and therefore a 
worst form of child labor.  
 
 Hazardous Activity: Due to the use of explosives as well as the practice of diving 
without proper safety equipment, fishers engaged in blast fishing are at risk for a 
number of injuries. Children are particularly at risk.  
 
 Physical Violence, Verbal Abuse: Nineteen percent of children interviewed 
reported being physically assaulted by their juragang as a punishment for making 
mistakes. Nearly all child workers interviewed reported verbal abuse (yelling).  
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Background & Setting 
 
This section provides an overview of three segments of the Indonesian fishing sector: 
platform (jermal) fishing, blast fishing, and small-boat fishing. Analysis is broken down 
into five key areas of inquiry: the place, product, people, policies, and programs (the five 
Ps); and then provides a history of working conditions – with a particular focus on forced 
labor – in the industry, and a look at how the 5Ps variables have interacted to either 
contribute to or ameliorate vulnerabilities to labor violations.  
 
 
The Five Ps of Platform-, Blast-, and Small-Boat Fishing in Indonesia: Place, 
Product, People, Policies and Programs 
 
With over 17,000 islands, Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world. Around 70 
percent of Indonesia`s territory consists of water,6 and the country is home to 
approximately 18 percent of 
the world‘s coral reefs.7 
Fishing is one of the country‘s 
major exports, earning USD 
2.66 billion in 2010.8 Major 
export markets are China, 
Thailand, Japan, US, 
Singapore, and Korea. In 
2010, Indonesia was ranked 
11th on the list of the world‘s 
fishery exporter countries. Over 60 percent of fish produced in Indonesia is caught on 
fishing boats, while the rest is produced through fish culture. Major fish species include 
mackerel, perch, mako, halibut, sole, stingray, grouper, lobster, and shrimp.9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fishing Sector in Indonesia, 2008 
Production (000 
Ton)(2008)3 
9,051.5 
Fishing Boats (000 
Ton)(2008)4 
5,196.3 
Fish Culture (000 
Ton)(2008)5 
3,855.2 
Major Export Markets China, Thailand, Japan, 
US, Singapore, Korea 
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Place 
 
 
Jermals 
Blast Fishing 
 
 
 
Boat Fishing 
Figure 1 - Map of Indonesia10 
 
 The shallow waters around western Indonesia produce about two-thirds of the total fish 
catch for the country. Small-scale fishers are confined to fishing the coral reefs using 
lines, traps, beach seine or lift nets. Small scale operations produce over 90 percent of 
total marine-fishery production. Industrial fisheries contribute considerably more in value 
terms, since they are focused on high-value shrimp and tuna stocks.11  
 
An FAO study revealed that Indonesia has an enormous amount of unreported catch 
(over 1.5 million tons annually), much of it illegal.12 13 There are several types of illegal 
fishing in Indonesia, including blast fishing, trawl-net fishing,14 and cyanide (or poison 
fishing).15 Verité‘s study focuses on blast fishing, jermal fishing, and small-boat anchovy 
fishing.16  
 
Due to Indonesia‘s location between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the country has two 
primary seasons: ―East Season‖ between April and October; and ―West Season‖ from 
November - March. While fishing is conducted during both seasons, the East season is 
known to have calmer, better conditions for fishing, so the sector is generally more 
active during that time. The summer or ―West Season‖ is also known as ―famine‖ 
season, and is marked by high tide, heavy rain, and winds from the west. However, 
fishing expeditions do go out when the weather is sufficiently calm. Workers in the fish 
industry may go through periods of heavy work in the East Season, only to have periods 
of little to no work in the West Season. The weather was particularly stormy during the 
2011 West Season, causing fish prices to increase by 50 percent in January 2012 due 
to lack of supply.17 (See a more nuanced discussion of East and West season in 
Methodology.) 
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Product 
 
Platform (Jermal) Fishing 
Jermals are large wooden fishing platforms. Jermals are 
on average 20 by 40 meters in area, but can measure up 
to 50 meters by 70 meters.18 They are located anywhere 
from five to 18 miles from shore, in the open ocean.  
 
Jermals rose to prominence as a means of anchovy 
fishing in the 1970s and remained popular through the 
early 2000s. During the height of their prominence in the 
1990s, research placed the number of active jermals 
between 395 and 800 with an estimated 8,000 workers, 
approximately 75 percent of whom were children.19 The 
industry is now on a steep decline due to a combination of 
factors including the launch of the National Action Plan against Child Labor and the 
2004 tsunami. In 2004, the ILO estimated that there were 120 operational jermals.20 
Verité field research found that there were 12 remaining jermals in 2010. 
 
The harvest season on the jermal is based on the monthly lunar cycle, with two harvest 
seasons per lunar cycle (approximately two per month). During this time hours are 
longer, as anchovies must be processed (boiled and dried) shortly after they are 
collected.  
 
Jermal workers catch, process and prepare fish for shipment. The fish, mainly 
anchovies, are taken by the jermal owner to processors and traders at coastal locations. 
Traders usually process, dry and package the fish, and the product is sold primarily for 
domestic consumption, but also for regional export.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Example of Jermal – Verité 
Photo 
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Small-Boat Anchovy Fishing  
The fishing sector in Indonesia is comprised of artisanal and commercial fishing. 
Artisanal fishing is mainly conducted for subsistence by fishers and their families in 
smaller vessels (typically less than ten gross tons). These boats conduct fishing trips of 
one to two days and operate near port areas. Commercial fishing is primarily composed 
of small-scale commercial fishing boats, with a small number of large-scale commercial 
fishing boats in Indonesia.21  
 
There are two primary types of 
anchovy boats found in North 
Sumatra. Large boats weigh more 
than 20 tons and have more on-board 
equipment. They are able to go on 
fishing trips of up to ten days. Smaller 
boats lack room for storage and 
navigation systems – these boats 
only go out for one day at a time, so 
workers do not sleep on the boats. 
 
Fishers on large boats usually work 
about 20 days per month. Their 
fishing trips are guided by the lunar 
calendar and the weather. Depending 
on the size of the boat, crews can include at least ten people. The boat crew is 
organized into a clear hierarchy, with an admiral at the top, assisted by a manager, 
mechanic and cook, and many workers.  
 
Fishing boat work is labor intensive and carries high physical risks for workers. The ILO 
has identified fishing as one of the most hazardous types of work.22 Hazards include 
casualties due to bad weather or loss of power, inadequate or unsuitable boat 
construction, becoming entangled in nets or ropes, or capsizing due to gear snags or 
the downward pressure of a large catch during the last stage of net hauling.  
 
Working conditions on small fishing boats has been poorly documented. In 2004, the 
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor published Child Labor in 
Offshore Fishing, North Sumatra: A Rapid Assessment, detailing labor abuses on 
fishing boats in Indonesia. The report found that children and adults surveyed worked 
between ten and 12 hours a day but up to 19 hours without sleeping or resting, without 
safety gear or proper tools. Most respondents received no vegetables, fruit or milk while 
at sea.23 
 
In December 2011, the Indonesian Seafarers‘ Association condemned the deaths of five 
Indonesian fishers on a Korean flagged fishing boat who were recruited by a human 
trafficking syndicate in Jakarta. The workers were paid USD 180 per month, when the 
Figure 3 - Verité Photo 
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minimum wage on fishing ships is USD 550 per month.24 United Fisheries, a New 
Zealand fishing company, has been charged in several slavery-related claims by 
Indonesian fishers.25  
 
Extreme labor exploitation on fishing boats in Indonesian waters has been documented 
on boats hailing from Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma, among others.26 About 3,000 
miles east of Jakarta, the remote island of Tual has become a depository for hundreds 
of exploited Burmese fishers who are no longer deemed useful or who have escaped 
the boats on which they were held in servitude.27 28 
 
Blast Fishing  
 
In blast fishing, fishers watch for schools of fish in coral reefs or in open water, position 
their boats approximately five meters from the school, then throw a home-made bomb 
made from ammonium nitrate mixed with fertilizers and fuel oil into the water. Fishers 
dive into the water after the blast to collect fish that are killed or stunned by the 
explosion.  
 
Blast fishing is relatively common in South Sulawesi; one report estimates that more 
than 75 percent of fishers practice blast fishing.29 
 
The most common catch from blast fishing is a mix of fulier, scad, and sardines; 
grouper, snapper, surgeonfish, and rabbitfish are rarer.30 Previous research has 
attributed increasing demand for these types of fish to increased demand for exports 
and well as the expansion of tourism in the area.31 Fish processing companies with 
access to international markets have opened in the provincial capital, Makassar, where 
fish harvested through blast fishing are sold to middlemen. Catch from blast fishing is 
destined for the domestic market due to its fragile condition.  
 
Research on forced labor in blast fishing for the current study was conducted in the 
Spermonde archipelago, which consists of over 100 small islands off the coast of South 
Sulawesi in the Makassar Strait.32 33 The spread-out nature of these islands, combined 
with a low population density, make them hard to patrol or monitor. Kodingareng, the 
island in which research was carried out, is one of the smaller Spermonde islands, at 
about 48 square kilometers, with a population of 4,200.34 
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People 
 
Indonesian fishing activity provides over six million persons with direct employment, 
consisting of approximately 3.8 million fishers and 2.3 million fish farmers. With the 
typical Indonesian family unit numbering five people, the fishing sector is estimated to 
support 34 million people throughout the country.35 This number is much higher when 
illegal fishing is included.  
 
Of those working in capture fishing, most (3.3 million) gain their livelihood from the sea, 
although about a half million work in inland (river and lake) capture fishing. 36 The fishing 
methods discussed in this report, including blast fishing, small-boat fishing, and jermals, 
all fall into the marine capture category. 
  
Employment in the Indonesian fisheries sectors, 2003.37 
Category  2003 
Capture, 
comprising  
3 857 597  
- marine  3 311 821  
- inland 545 776  
Culture  2 384 238 
Total  6 241 835  
 
Much of the fishing in Indonesia follows patterns of traditional patronage relationships. 
For example, fishers involved in anchovy boat fishing in North Sumatra are involved in a 
traditional fishing structure in which power is concentrated with boat owners and their 
admirals. Fishers must maintain good relationships with these powerful individuals to 
maintain the right to continue fishing with them. There are two main types of actors 
engaged in blast fishing. The boat owner is the ‗boss‘ (referred to as the juragang) and 
provides necessary materials such as explosives. The fishers themselves are known as 
the sawi. They accompany the juragang on the fishing trip and share in the catch. The 
juragang sells fish caught by the sawi at the mainland market, thereby acting as a 
middleman. In some cases, juragang can secure ―connections‖ with government 
officials, essentially paying a bribe to protect his crew from harassment.38  
 
In small boat fishing, the admiral and boat owners provide loans to workers and capital 
for the venture.  
 
Policies 
 
The main fisheries authority in Indonesia is the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
(DKP). According to key informants interviewed by Verité, after decentralization laws 
were enacted in 1999, local government at the district level was assigned to manage 
manpower affairs. Central government is tasked with policy making, guidance, advisory, 
and assistance roles but local governments are tasked with ensuring that laws and 
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policies are implemented on the ground through dissemination of policy and law, 
inspection, and program implementation. However, local governments often lack 
capacity and infrastructure to implement programs or to carry out monitoring and 
inspection. Currently, all districts in North Sumatra have only 80 inspectors, including 19 
provincial inspectors. Further, inspectors rarely have capacity at the level of informal 
employment, such as fishing, where vulnerable populations are likely to work.  
 
While there is much fishery legislation in Indonesia, little of it deals directly with issues 
of forced labor. At the national level, fisheries and aquaculture are regulated by 
Fisheries Law No. 31/2004(2004). Provincial Governments are held responsible for the 
management, use and conservation of marine resources in their own territory, within 
territorial waters under Law No.22/1999 on Regional Administration (1999). The 2011 
Fisheries Law39 states that the Government shall consider small fishers and small fish 
breeders as a protected category and provide them with loans, local or foreign funds, 
education and training.40  
 
Since 1998, Indonesia has ratified all eight International Labor Organization core 
conventions on protecting internationally recognized worker rights and allowed trade 
unions to organize. However, the US State Department notes that enforcement of labor 
laws and protections of workers‘ rights remain inconsistent and weak in some areas.41 
The minimum age for employment in Indonesia is 15 years. Despite laws forbidding 
child workers aged 14 and younger in all economic sectors, economic necessity and a 
lack of alternatives continue to force or encourage the employment of children.42 
Indonesia‘s slow economic recovery has pushed more workers into the informal sector, 
which reduces legal protection and creates conditions for an increase in child labor.43 
 
Indonesia passed a comprehensive anti-trafficking bill in April 2007. The bill criminalizes 
debt bondage, labor exploitation, sexual exploitation, and transnational and internal 
trafficking. Penalties range from three to 15 years of imprisonment. The bill also 
contains provisions to prosecute corporate entities and government officials involved in 
trafficking. Penalties under the Child Protection Act for child trafficking are three to 15 
years of imprisonment.44  
 
Indonesia is surrounded by several large Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (RFMOs) which include the Regional Plan of Action to Promote 
Responsible Fishing, the Sulu-Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion Program, the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission (IOTC) and The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC).45 However, these organizations focus on overfishing and illegal fishing, not 
labor issues.  
 
In June 2011, fishing policies were approved that regulate the involvement of foreign 
fishing companies in Indonesia. For example, foreign companies wishing to establish 
fishing operations in Indonesia must have integrated fishing operations, meaning that 
these companies must not only have fishing boats but processing operations in 
Indonesia as well. Additionally, the export of fresh fish from Indonesia is not allowed. 
The fish must first be processed in Indonesia, and only processing companies may 
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export this processed fish. Further, there are strict limits on how many workers on board 
a vessel may be foreign workers. Within six years, all workers on fishing vessels must 
be Indonesian in order to receive a permit to continue operating. As boat owners try to 
staff their vessels, they will have to select workers from a smaller pool of workers 
without the possibility of hiring foreign workers. This may give workers increased 
leverage in terms of negotiating pay and working conditions. 
 
The Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Ministry plans to increase Indonesia‘s fish production 
to 22.39 million tons by 2015, a significant jump from the 14.87 million tons targeted for 
2012. The Ministry estimated that production could reach 12.3 million tons in 2011, up 
from 11.2 million tons in 2010.  
 
The National Action Plan against Child Labor was launched in 2002 by Presidential 
decree. Measures of the National Action Plan (NAP) included awareness raising, 
education, and training of school dropouts; removal of child workers from offshore 
fisheries, drug distribution, and the footwear industry; a survey of child workers; and 
training of labor inspectors. According to information supplied by the government, 
19,863 children were prevented from entering child labor and its worst forms and 10,922 
were removed from such activities in 2006; 28,863 were prevented from entering child 
labor and its worst forms and 13,922 were removed from such activities in 2007.46 
Under the NAP, national and local governments undertook an extensive monitoring 
process to identify and withdraw children working on jermals. The NAP also increased 
legal penalties for jermal owners found to be employing children, making the practice 
significantly less attractive to jermal owners, who, prior to the program, reportedly 
colluded with maritime officials to easily avoid any penalty. 
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Programs 
 
Several international organizations have a long history of working in the Indonesian 
fishing industry including the ILO, USDOL, and the WWF. Major fishing and/or labor-
related programs in Indonesia are listed below by organization 
 
Programs on Fishing and/or Forced Labor in Indonesia 
 
Organization Activities 
Asian 
Development 
Bank 
ADB is involved in coral reef rehabilitation and providing support for the 
development of sustainable inshore fisheries management in Indonesia. 
A USD 33 million loan is supporting work to develop sustainable coral 
reef fishing in six districts in three provinces of Sumatra.47 
DFID In 2005, DFID launched an action plan with the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs to combat illegal fishing in 
Indonesia and several other countries.48 49 The project is focused on 
environmental sustainability. 
ILO In December 2011, the FAO and ILO published a preliminary version of 
Good Practice Guide for Addressing Child Labor in Fisheries and 
Aquaculture: Policy and Practice.50 Key messages of the guide are that 
a child is a person under 18 years of age and that there is a need to 
distinguish between acceptable work performed by children and child 
labor.51 ―Child labor is by definition harmful and unacceptable and should 
be abolished."52 The Guide provides an overview of current information 
on child labor in the fisheries and aquaculture sector and of existing 
international legal and policy frameworks. 
 
In 2007, the ILO established the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 
188), and its accompanying Work in Fishing Recommendation, 2007 
(No. 199) to ensure that ―fishers have decent conditions of work on 
board fishing vessels with regard to minimum requirements for work on 
board; conditions of service; accommodation and food; occupational 
safety and health protection; medical care and social security.‖53 While 
the Convention was adopted in 2007, it will not come into effect until it is 
ratified by 10 of the ILO‘s 180 member States.54 The ILO's Action Plan 
2011-2016 involves data collection, training workshops, development of 
model legislation, and capacity building towards ratification and 
implementation of the convention.55  
 
The ILO has several programs on sex trafficking and child labor. 
NORAD sponsored the ILO's Combating Forced Labor and Trafficking of 
Indonesian Migrant Workers from 2006-2008, but fishing is not 
specifically addressed.56  
Norway-
NORAD 
NORAD does a lot of work in marine research and statistics.57 NORAD 
is also active in human rights activities in Indonesia, beginning in 2002, 
mainly related to political consultations at the state secretary / cabinet 
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minister level and seminars involving Norwegian and Indonesian experts 
from research communities, public institutions and NGOs. Programs 
focus on human rights education, legal reform, human rights in the 
military and security sectors.58 
 
 
UNDP UNDP works with local partners through the Small Grants Program to 
end cyanide fishing and protect coral reefs in Bali. Projects include 
training of community organizers to catch ornamental fish by using nets 
and coral transplantation and biological monitoring. UNDP and the GEF 
Small Grants Program also helped its local partner-grantees to establish 
a community-owned trading company. The fishers and traders in the 
company were trained in fish handling and packaging, and were able to 
obtain trading and transportation permits to export ornamental fish. The 
company then started selling its products in Europe, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Japan and Israel. Several provinces, including regions in Bali, 
West Java, Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara and Papua, have replicated 
policies and practices from the program.59 
UNEP-
WCMC 
Reefs at Risk in Southeast Asia (RRSEA) is published by WRI, the UN 
Environment Program World Conservation Monitoring Center (UNEP-
WCMC), ICLARM - The World Fish Center, and the International Coral 
Reef Action Network. Funds for the project are provided by the David 
and Lucile Packard Foundation, the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the United Nations Foundation (UNF), and 
USAID.60  
USDOL The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) has financed projects on the 
elimination of child labor in Indonesia valued at over US$26 million over 
the last 10 years. Fishing-related programs include the Program to 
Combat Child Labor in the Fishing Sector in Indonesia and the 
Philippines—Phases I and II (1999-2004), Fishing and Footwear Sectors 
Program to Combat Hazardous Child Labor in Indonesia, Phase II 
(2002-2004), Support to the Indonesian National Plan of Action and the 
Development of the Time bound Program for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labor (Including Aceh Addendum) (2003-2008), 
Enable Program: Enabling Aceh to Combat Exploitation Through 
Education (Enable/Aceh) (2005-2009), and to some extent Combating 
WFCL Through an Area-Based Approach (EXCEED) (2009-2013).61 62 63  
 
In 2010, the USDOL was involved in two multiyear projects, totaling 
USD11.2 million, that target children exploited in or at risk of being 
exploited in many industries.64 65 Neither project specifically targeted the 
fishing industry. 
USAID For fishing, USAID focuses on improved management of marine 
ecosystems through Coral Triangle Support Partnership – Indonesia 
(CTSP-I) with partners WWF, Indonesia Marine and Climate Support 
(IMACS) Project with partner Chemonics, and the National Oceanic and 
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Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Training Program 
World Bank The World Bank has many development projects in Indonesia, but has 
no specific fishing projects dealing with labor. For example, in 2005, the 
World Bank awarded Indonesia a USD 56.2 million loan to rehabilitate 
some of the country's most threatened coral reefs and establish effective 
management of these coral reef fishing resources.66 
WWF The World Wildlife Fund is active in Indonesian Fishing programs. In 
August 2010, the WWF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
with the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) to further 
sustainable development on marine resources management practices, 
which also has a research and policy development component. At the 
one-year anniversary of the MoU signing, the WWF noted that progress 
is slow on implementing the initiatives.67 
 
WWF, with partners TNF, Wakatobi National Park Office, Wakatobi 
community organizations, and Komunto, an organization composed of 
fishers, has developed the KOMUNTO ―fish bank‖ model, which has 
been adopted by other local fishing communities. The model outlaws 
explosives and sedatives. The program won the Equator Initiative Prize 
in 2010.68 
 
WWF's Coral Reef Alliance is focused on eco-tourism and is not labor-
related. Partners include Conservation International, the Head of the 
Regency Government (Bupati), and the Nature Conservancy.69 
 
 
CSR in the Fishing Industry in Indonesia:  
Fishing as a CSR concern tends to focus on sustainable fishing and mitigating negative 
environmental impacts on coral reefs. Labor issues are not generally well-addressed.70 
The Indonesian CSR Awards, given out every three years, is organized by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and the Corporate Forum for Community Development (CFCD). No 
fishing companies have received the award.71  
 
In 2007, Indonesia became the first country in the world to pass a CSR law, Article 74, 
requiring companies to provide funds for CSR. Article 74 stipulates firms must allocate 
budgets for CSR programs and the programs must be run according to government 
regulations.72 Unfortunately, there was no government enabling legislation for the article 
until October 2011, rendering Article 74 practically ineffective.73 How to implement 
Article 74 in Indonesia is a key topic at the 1st International Conference on Corporate 
Social Responsibility, Business and Human Rights in May 2012 in Jakarta. 74  
 
In the context of using the CSR tax for development of Indonesia's fishing industry, 75 
the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) announced plans in January 2012 
to revitalize traditional fishponds on the north coast of Java. As part of this initiative, the 
MMAF asked the government for financing for fishers and fish farmers, saying if they 
have trouble accessing financing, they will depend on loan sharks and it will be difficult 
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to increase production. As a first step, around 8,000 fisheries extension agents will 
conduct baseline data collection in early 2012. 76 
 
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries77 was established in 1999 ―to establish 
principles, in accordance with the relevant rules of international law, for responsible 
fishing and fisheries activities, taking into account all their relevant biological, 
technological, economic, social, environmental and commercial aspects.‖78 A WWF 
report in 2009 evaluating the impact of the Code in Indonesia gave the country a fail 
grade for ―the health of fisheries, fishing communities, and the ecosystems they depend 
on.‖79 80 The NGO Friends of the Sea offers certification in sustainability, and the Global 
Aquaculture Alliance provides certification in its Best Aquaculture Practices (BAP) for 
tilapia farming.81 There does not appear to be a labor component to any of the Codes. 
 
Responsibly sourced seafood is a growing CSR trend for retail chains in the US and 
Europe. Companies such as Target vow to only sell sustainable and fully traceable fish 
by a specific date – in Target‘s case, by 2015.82 Retailers sourcing fish responsibly from 
Indonesia include Harris Teeter83, Whole Foods, Wal-Mart, Safeway, Target84, and 
Tesco (UK), among others.85 Most of these retailers use the Marine Stewardship 
Council‘s eco-label, which requires chain of custody certification. To date, the 
Sustainable Seafood label does not overtly discuss labor rights, although one of the 
three core components is that ―the fishery is subject to an effective management system 
that respects local, national and international laws and standards and incorporates 
institutional and operational frameworks that require use of the resource to be 
responsible and sustainable.‖86  
 
Billed as a CSR Initiative, the Lesser Sunda Sustainable Fisheries Initiative concerns a 
group of stakeholders and supporting organizations including the Nature Conservancy, 
the Work Bank, World Wildlife Fund, Sustainable Fisheries Partnership and the 
Indonesian Department of Marine Affairs. The program includes education and training 
programs, sustainability elements, and access to financing. North Atlantic, Inc. (S-Corp), 
a Portland, ME-based seafood processor and distributor is the primary leader in the 
design, capital formation and execution of the Indonesian fisheries business model.87 
 
Another new CSR/sustainability initiative in Indonesia is ―Seafood Savers‖, a WWF 
program to implement eco-friendly business practices and traceability in the marine and 
fisheries sector. It covers major players in the fishery industry, such as producers, 
suppliers, buyers, retailers, and financial institutions. Sea Delight, LLC, a Miami-based 
importer and UD Pulau Mas, a major Indonesian fish supplier, are leaders in the 
program.88 
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Methodology & Limitations 
 
Verité‘s research in Indonesia initially aimed to research indicators of forced labor on 
fishing platforms (jermals) in North Sumatra province. This research was subsequently 
expanded to examine small-boat anchovy fishing in North Sumatra, and blast fishing in 
South Sulawesi province. Researchers expanded their investigations into small-boat 
anchovy fishing to give a more complete picture of the anchovy supply chain in North 
Sumatra (as jermals also catch anchovies). Blast fishing was selected due to the high 
level of regional production, and a lack of understanding of labor implications.  
 
The research design used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (non-
probability sampling). Quantitative data was gathered via surveys using both 
convenience and snowball sampling to select respondents. Therefore, the quantitative 
findings from this study are biased by the use of nonprobability sampling. The 
quantitative portion of the research was not meant to be statistically representative at 
the national or sectoral level, but to offer trends, analysis, and insight into conditions 
facing workers in the sectors studied. 
 
Qualitative data was gathered by including more informal interviews with workers and 
stakeholders, worksite observation, focus groups, and case studies. The qualitative 
findings were used to add greater detail to the quantitative findings, and to triangulate 
quantitative findings.   
 
The following broad priorities guided the research: 
 collecting and updating existing information on the demographics and 
livelihood strategies of workers in jermal, blast and small-boat anchovy 
fishing in Indonesia; 
 documenting working conditions and identifying any existing indicators of 
forced labor within these fishing sectors; and 
 describing the circumstances that contribute to worker vulnerability to 
forced labor within these fishing sectors. 
 
Verité‘s field research team was led by a Jakarta-based legal and labor rights 
specialist.89 Field research was carried out by a lead researcher and teams of local 
researchers that had both experience with the fishing sector and labor issues, and solid 
connections with the communities of concern. In North Sumatra, the team comprised 
two independent consultants, with academic and practical experience that provided 
them with strong understanding of, and relations with, the island communities and the 
fishing industry.  
 
The research commenced with a literature review, expert consultations, and a rapid 
appraisal process.90 Field research comprised worker surveys, focus group discussions, 
and case studies. Upon completion of the field research, the data were collated, 
cleaned, and analyzed by the Indonesia-based team, and then further analyzed and 
condensed by Verité.  
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Research Design 
 
Verité‘s methodology was anchored in the principles of the ILO‘s Convention 29, which 
contains the internationally accepted definition of forced labor. The presence of forced 
labor was not presupposed in the research. Rather, the research probed for the 
presence of indicators of forced labor and other exploitative labor conditions, as 
established by the ILO in ―Identifying Forced Labor in Practice‖, which was published by 
the Special Action Program on Forced Labor in a 2005 report, A Global Alliance Against 
Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-Up to the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. 
 
At the start of the research initiative, categories for indicators of forced labor were 
developed based on ILO guidance that breaks down indicators of forced labor into those 
related to lack of consent and to menace of penalty, as shown below. 91 
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Information about wages and hours was also included in Verité‘s study, as wage and 
hour violations may constitute indicators of forced labor.  
 
The research process began with initial meetings in Jakarta to conceptualize the 
project, identify the sectors and locales to be researched, and develop an appropriate 
methodology.  
 
Existing research was reviewed, and contacts were made with experts in the fishing 
industry. It was at this stage that it was determined that the practice of jermal fishing 
was in a steep decline and essentially dying out. To enhance the value and policy 
relevance of the research effort, therefore, the team broadened the literature review, 
expert consultation, and appraisal process to include an assessment of other potential 
areas of concern within various fish supply chains of Indonesia. Given that the primary 
yield of jermal fishing is anchovies, researchers first expanded their investigations in 
North Sumatra to include small-boat anchovy fishing, an industry that has been 
associated with the potential for induced indebtedness and child labor. The eventual 
decision to include blast fishing in South Sulawesi Province as well was made for 
several reasons: the region contributes significantly to national fish production; the 
incidence of illegal fishing92 is high; the environmental aspects of blast fishing are well-
documented and have garnered international attention, but labor practices are relatively 
poorly understood; and the possibility of induced indebtedness, child labor, and patron-
client dependency between boat captain and fisherman were identified. 
 
Once the three target areas of research were established, additional expert 
consultations and desk research were carried out to identify critical areas of concern 
relating to labor and human rights, and to highlight key lines of questioning to be 
pursued. Based on this preliminary research, specific research questions were 
developed, including: 
 
 questions designed to solicit basic demographic data on workers and supervisors 
involved in jermal-, blast- and small-boat anchovy fishing: 
o age 
o sex 
o household composition 
o employment history 
o community of origin 
 questions designed to solicit basic data on the establishment: 
o name and location of the jermal or boat 
o number of years of operation 
o fishing area covered by the jermal or boat 
o general physical condition of the establishment 
 questions designed to solicit information on working conditions: 
o wages and payment mechanisms 
 wage levels 
 evidence of delayed payment, withholdings, deductions 
 currency of payment – in cash or in kind 
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o hours of work 
 average levels and highest levels 
 evidence of compulsory/forced overtime 
o verbal / physical harassment 
o health and safety 
 questions designed to solicit information on entry into the sector: 
o recruitment patterns 
o evidence of lack of consent, deception, fees paid, loans taken 
 questions designed to solicit information on existence and circumstances of debt: 
o presence of debt 
o circumstances of debt – reason for borrowing, interest, to whom debt is 
held, whether it acts as a binding agent, whether it is inherited 
o patterns of debt-taking 
o payment arrangements 
 questions designed to solicit information on freedom of movement and ability to 
terminate employment 
 questions designed to solicit information on presence and nature of child labor: 
o demographic information on child laborers 
o information from parents on decision for child to work, entry into sector 
o working conditions of child 
o living conditions of child 
o debt held by child or child‘s parents 
 
Research teams were trained on the use of survey instruments and appropriate 
techniques for accessing and gathering information from vulnerable populations. Given 
that many respondents do not think of themselves as being in situations of forced labor 
or extreme exploitation, researchers were instructed not to use these terms, but rather 
to ask questions about specific indicators of forced labor or extreme exploitation. 
Researchers additionally used information gleaned from observation of the work 
establishments themselves, and from interviews with community leaders, NGO 
representatives, and government workers to triangulate the direct reports from workers.  
 
In addition to workers, a broad range of other key informants were consulted for the 
research, including:  
 Jermal supervisors and owners 
 Fishing boat supervisors and owners 
 Worker families 
 Village leaders 
 Fishers community leaders 
 Local NGOs 
 Government offices 
o Local statistic bureau office, 
o Manpower office of North Sumatra 
o Ministry of Fishery official 
 Fisherman Associations 
 Academic experts 
 P a g e  | 26 
 International organization officials 
 
 
Timing 
 
The research was timed to coincide with peak, middle, and low seasons of fishing 
activity. Indonesia occupies a cross position between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, 
and the country has several distinct fishing seasons: 
 a westerly monsoon, or wet season (known locally as the ―West Season‖), which 
runs from December through March, when rains are heavier, winds and waves 
strong, and the boat fishing difficult – this is the high season for jermal fishing 
though, as fish tend to reside in waters closer to shore during the monsoon 
season;  
 a relatively dry, southeasterly monsoon season (known locally as the ―East 
Season‖), when rains are relatively light, the waves and wind relatively calm, and 
the fishing is good – this season runs from June to September;  
 two ―transition‖ seasons, in April-May and October-November, when rain is 
frequent but the waves and wind are weaker – these seasons are also 
considered good for boat fishing.  
 
The first round of field research took place from September 2010 to January 2011. 
During this round, researchers observed and interviewed jermal workers, blast fishers, 
and small-boat fishers. Community members and other local stakeholders were also 
interviewed. A second round of field research was conducted from April through August 
of 2011. During this second round, more targeted research was performed to follow up 
on trends and questions elicited from the first round of research. Interview respondents 
were asked to report on their conditions of work over the previous year, with the 
exception of former jermal workers who reported on their experiences during whatever 
period of time they had worked on the jermals.  Case studies and focus group 
discussions were held at this time. A final round of expert consultations was held in 
early 2012, to present and validate research findings, and solicit policy 
recommendations from key experts and stakeholders.  
 
Location and Scope of Research 
 
Platform (Jermal) Fishing in North Sumatra Province 
 
Jermal fishing is traditionally restricted to the province of North Sumatra. Jermals are 
large platforms (approximately 15 meters by 10 meters, according to researcher 
observation) located either close to shore, or anywhere from five to 18 miles from shore 
in the open ocean, suspended several meters above the water on pillar-like log 
supports. Researchers targeted the off-shore platforms for research, given that these 
were the platforms where child labor and extreme exploitation had been identified in 
past research.  
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Researchers sought to establish the sample universe through consultation with local 
community leaders and fishers, and based on the first-hand knowledge of jermal 
locations of one member of the research team. 
 
Researchers established the continued existence and operation of 12 jermals. All 12 
were visited.  
 
A total of 76 jermal workers were interviewed, including 56 current93 jermal workers; and 
20 former94 jermal workers. Among current workers, three workers were under 18: one 
16 year old and two 17 year olds. All workers interviewed were male. Further 
demographic characterization of workers interviewed is provided in the Demographic 
Characteristics of Respondents section. 
 
15 surveys were administered to jermal supervisors.  
 
Small-Boat Anchovy Fishing 
 
Research on small-boat anchovy fishing in North Sumatra was carried out in the ports of 
Belawan and Tanjung Balai. These two ports were chosen because of their status as 
the two biggest producers of anchovies in North Sumatra.  
 
A total of 212 workers involved with the small-boat sector were interviewed including 
100 adults and 112 children ages nine to 17. Approximately 70 children interviewed 
worked directly on boats and the remaining children worked in anchovy workshops or in 
other auxiliary tasks (described in the Case Study in Appendix I.) Further demographic 
characterization of workers interviewed is provided in ‘Demographic Characteristics of 
Respondents.’ 
 
 
 
 
Blast Fishing 
 
The Spermonde archipelago, where research was conducted, is comprised of a total 
area of 40,000 hectares and consists of over 100 small islands. The islands are located 
off of the coast of South Sulawesi in the Makassar Strait, and about 54 are populated.95 
Most have only been populated since World War II.96 The spread-out nature of these 
islands, combined with a low population density, make them hard to patrol or monitor.  
 
Kodingareng, the island in which research was carried out, is one of the small 
Spermonde islands. The island is administratively part of the Makassar government 
district. The island is small (about 48 square kilometers). The population of the island is 
approximately 1,200.97 The education level of the residents is low, with most having only 
an elementary level education.98 Previous research found approximately 20-30 blast 
fishing bosses (juragang), each with approximately six workers (sawi); and a number of 
other boats practicing trawl-net and bagang (purse seine) fishing. An estimated 55 to 75 
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percent of all boats on the island practice some kind of illegal fishing.99 Other livelihoods 
on the island include more traditional types of fishing, small-scale vending, government 
work, and construction.100  
 
Kodingareng was chosen for research for three primary reasons. First, previous 
research had determined that a high percentage of boat fishing activity on the island 
was illegal.101 Second, the total population of boat fishers was established by previous 
research.102 Finally, Kodingareng was selected because two members of the Verité 
research team had good knowledge of and relationships with the blast fishing 
communities on the island and had participated in previous environmental research 
there. Thus they were known to and trusted by the communities on the island and could 
therefore facilitate access to the somewhat secretive blast-fishing industry.  
 
Verité researchers interviewed a total of 64 respondents involved in blast fishing, 
including 22 child and juvenile workers and 42 adults. Further demographic 
characterization of workers interviewed is provided in the Demographic Characteristics 
of Respondents section. 
 
 
Sampling and Access  
 
Jermals 
 
In the case of jermals, research was conducted among two populations: current and 
former jermal workers. Research conducted on jermal platforms were establishment 
surveys, in which informal interviews were collected from supervisors, general 
observation of the establishment was performed, and formal surveys were conducted 
with 76 jermal workers, of which 56 were current works and 20 were former workers.  
 
Researchers identified what they believe to be the last 12 remaining jermals and 
conducted research at each of these.  
 
Researchers first notified community leaders and jermal owners of the study and their 
desire to visit the jermals. Permission was obtained, and boat transportation was then 
arranged. Because it could take up to four hours of boat travel to reach a jermal, a visit 
to one jermal required a full day‘s research. Research was contingent on good weather 
conditions, and accessing the jermals was somewhat dangerous because only small 
boats were available for transportation, and the waves on the open sea were sometimes 
quite large.103  
 
Due to the small physical space of the jermal, supervisors were present for all 
interviews with current jermal workers, which severely limited the ability of current jermal 
workers to be honest about the conditions of their work. Interviews with former jermal 
workers were conducted to fill in details about these conditions, as well as mechanisms 
of coercion. 
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Former jermal workers were identified by snowball sampling, and no claims are made 
for statistical representativeness. Verité researchers consulted with community 
members to identify former jermal workers who would be willing to engage with 
researchers, and spoke with them in their home communities in North Sumatra.  
 
Small-Boat Anchovy Fishing 
 
Convenience samples were drawn among small-boat anchovy fishes and 127 
respondents were interviewed. 115 respondents were adults and 112 respondents were 
children.  
 
Researchers first approached community leaders to obtain a list of all boat owners and 
their admirals in each of the two ports. Admirals were then approached to obtain the 
names of their crew members. Adult and child fishers were approached and were asked 
if they would be willing to participate in the research. Adult and child fishers were 
interviewed in their homes where boat admirals were not present.  
 
Access to the port towns was straightforward, with clear transportation routes and 
readily accessible modes of transport. Access to the boat fishers and to workers in 
anchovy workshops was similarly straightforward and unrestricted. Researchers were 
able to board fishing boats for informal observation, but did not travel along with the 
fishers on fishing trips.  
 
Blast Fishing 
 
Kodingareng is geographically remote, and access is somewhat challenging; one must 
arrange to travel there by small, irregular boat. Access to workers was particularly 
challenging in this case. Because of the illegal nature of the work, the industry operates 
essentially underground, and fishers are especially hesitant to interact with outsiders. 
Access was facilitated by a member of the Verité research team with local connections.  
 
Blast fishers were selected for interviews using convenience and snowball sampling. 
Researchers first identified a set of juragang through networking with community 
leaders. These juragang were approached, rapport was established, and the juragang 
were asked to provide names of the boat crew for interviews. After these interviews 
were conducted, snowball sampling techniques were used to identify additional 
respondents.   
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Leaders 
Juragangs 
Fishers 
Additional 
Fishers 
*Blast Fishing Snowball Sampling Chain 
 
Ultimately, 64 blast fishers were interviewed, including 42 adults and 22 childre. 
Researchers interviewed respondents in a variety of settings, including at ports, in their 
communities of residence, and on-board boats during fishing trips. The bulk of 
interviews were conducted at fishers‘s homes. While the interviews aboard boats might 
have compromised the ability of workers to reply candidly to direct questions, other 
valuable information was gained through observation; and data gained directly from 
workers was triangulated with findings from workers interviewed in private settings.  
 
During the research, the Verité team was able to ride along and observe a blast fishing 
trip. At that time, the target fishing area was the water around the Kalmas Islands in 
West Sulawesi, close to the Kalimantan border. It took 13 hours just to reach the fishing 
waters, at a shallow-reef location called Taka in the local language of Lensi. This 
location is a favorite fishing spot for blast fishers, since it is shallow and can be 
accessed easily by divers.  
 
Data Verification and Analysis 
 
Following completion of the field research, the raw data were reviewed, cleaned, and 
entered into a spreadsheet. Reporting of findings by the Indonesia-based researchers 
was largely narrative and ethnographic in form, although quantitative raw data were also 
submitted to Verité headquarters in spreadsheet form. Verité staff performed further 
quantitative analysis of the raw data to verify the accuracy of the qualitative findings.  
 
Verité also conducted a post-hoc analysis of data in all six country studies by applying a 
larger set of forced labor indicators issued by the ILO in December 2011 (Hard to see, 
harder to count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate the Forced Labour of Adults of 
Children), which are intended for use in forced labor survey design and analysis but 
which were not available at the time the fieldwork was carried out.  For these results, 
please see Appendices III, IV, and V.  
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Limitations 
 
The ILO has recently noted the numerous difficulties associated with meaningful 
sampling of populations potentially involved in forced labor.104  
 
Because this study is not statistically representative at the national or sectoral level due 
to the use of non-random sampling, findings should not be generalized to the entire 
population or to establish prevalence. However, clear patterns emerged, and once 
triangulated with other sources, findings can point to the existence of trends and offer 
insight into realities facing workers in the fishing sector in Indonesia. 
 
On the 12 identified remaining jermals, research findings were compromised by the 
inability to access workers without supervisors present. Thus, an accurate 
understanding of their working conditions is left somewhat to speculation. Interviews 
with former jermal workers, while providing a more robust picture of conditions, were 
based on a small and unrepresentative sample that consequently yielded data that are 
somewhat outdated. It appeared that no former worker had worked on a jermal since 
the launch of the National Action Plan against Child Labor in 2004. Thus, some of the 
associated findings should be interpreted with caution. In particular, it seems likely that 
current jermal workers underreported incidents of abuse and other negative working 
conditions due to the presence of supervisors during the interviews. However it should 
be noted that not all findings were affected by this source of bias. The demographic 
profile information about mentally disabled workers, for example, is accurate. 
 
Findings for small-boat anchovy fishers are limited by the small sample size, and by a 
geographic focus on only two ports -- Belawan and Tanjung Balai. However, as noted 
above, these ports are the two biggest producers of anchovies in North Sumatra.  
 
Sample sizes for blast fishers and small-boat anchovy fisherman were determined by a 
combination of opportunities for access and research resources available, rather than 
on calculations of statistical significance. The focus of the research was on gaining in-
depth insight into the labor conditions within these sectors.  
 
The study of blast fishers is limited both by the sample size and by the its geographic 
concentration on one small island. Therefore the findings cannot be said to be 
representative of South Sulawesi province more broadly, or of the nation as a whole. 
However, based on expert consultation, the researchers have fair confidence that the 
patterns and dynamics of blast fishing on Kodingareng are reasonably similar to 
elsewhere in the Spermonde Islands of South Sulawesi province. There is also the 
potential for bias stemming from the illegal nature of blast fishing; subjects may have 
withheld or shielded researchers from key information.  
 
Finally, researchers gained only limited access to child workers without supervisors 
present. 
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Research Findings 
 
Major research findings are reported in three separate sections, for platforms/jermals, 
small-boat anchovy fishing, and blast fishing. Findings from a small case study of 
anchovy workshops in North Sumatra are located in Appendix III.  
 
The findings cover 1) Demographic characteristics 2) Presence of Forced Labor 
Indicators and 3) Other Issues of Concern. 
 
The categories for indicators of forced labor are based upon the ILO‘s guidance on 
―Identifying Forced Labor in Practice,‖ which are broken down into lack of consent and 
menace of penalty. 105  
 
Information about wages and hours has also been included, as wage and hour 
violations may constitute indicators of forced labor. Although the presence of these 
indicators signals an increased risk for forced labor, each case must be assessed 
individually to determine the interplay of indicators and the context to determine whether 
or not it rises to the level of forced labor. The following findings are based on worker 
interviews, as well as researchers‘ direct observations, expert consultations, and a 
comprehensive literature review.106  
 
Platform (Jermal) Fishing in North Sumatra Province 
 
Introduction and Current Understanding  
Figure 4 - Verité Photo, Jermal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jermals are a means of anchovy fishing used in the North Sumatra region of Indonesia, 
which is the largest producer of white anchovy in Indonesia.107 Jermals are large 
platforms (approximately 15 meters by 10 meters, according to researcher observation) 
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located either close to shore in bays and among coral reefs, or anywhere from five to 18 
miles from shore in the open ocean, suspended several meters above the water on 
pillar-like log supports. It takes between one and four hours by small fishing boat to 
reach the off-shore platforms. Workers live and sleep on jermals for periods up to three 
months. Jermals are primarily constructed from wood.  
 
About two-thirds of the jermal is an open-air platform area. The other third has a hut-like 
structure which is used to process fish (through boiling, drying and sorting), store 
processed fish, and provide shelter for workers.  
 
The practice of jermal fishing rose to prominence as a means of catching anchovy 
because fishers believe that anchovy are attracted to the wood pillars supporting the 
jermal structure. Once anchovy have been funneled to the center of the jermal, nets 
hung underneath the deck are pulled up by hand. The fish caught in the net are then 
sorted and then boiled and dried.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Verité Photo, Nets under jermal 
 
The large fishing nets on the jermal, known as astangkul and keroncong, are about 10 
meters by 20 meters in size. These are sunk into the water under the jermal. Every two 
hours they are lifted out, emptied and sunk. The haul is poured onto the floor to sort out 
―junk‖ catch such as jellyfish and poisonous sea snakes.108 
 
The work on jermals is labor intensive as described by former jermal workers to Verité 
researchers: 
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- Setting nets: nets are set in the front and back of the platform. Workers move 
the nets a bit to maximize catch as necessary but take them out only for 
repairs or replacement.  
- Pulling nets out of the water (Nggiling): The nets are regularly hauled out of 
the water using a winch so that the fish caught in them can be taken out of 
the nets. The nets do not rise up to the level of the platform – instead they are 
suspended between the surface of the sea and the bottom of the platform. It 
takes one or two workers to turn the winch and raise the nets. This is done 
when the nets are full of fish, which can be as often as every 15 minutes to 
once every two to three hours, depending on the tide and the season. On 
average, workers interviewed reported that the nets are raised approximately 
15 times per day. 
- Taking fish out of the nets (Nanggok): The fish are taken out from the nets 
and put into plastic or bamboo baskets. Workers have to go down from the 
jermal to take the fish from the suspended nets. They make their way down 
via a rope, and then climb back up with full baskets.  
- Sorting (Mengayak di air) 
- Boiling the fish: The sorted fish then are boiled in the hut. A specific worker is 
usually in charge of this task. The fish must be boiled each time the nets are 
raised to avoid spoilage.  
- Unfolding the plastic tarp: The workers unfold a heavy plastic tarp on the floor 
of the platform to dry the fish after they have been boiled.  
- Spreading the fish: After the fish have been boiled and the tarp is laid out, 
workers spread the fish on the tarp, making sure the layer is as thin as 
possible to ensure that the anchovies and other bycatch will dry.  
- Drying: While the fish dry under the sun, the workers must turn them over 
repeatedly by hand so they dry correctly and completely.  
- Sorting the fish  
- Packing the fish in a box or a closed basket  
- Weighing the fish 
 
Jermal workers catch, process, and prepare fish for shipment. The fish, mainly 
anchovies, are taken by the jermal owner to processors and traders at coastal locations. 
Traders usually process, dry and package the fish, and the product is sold primarily for 
domestic consumption, although some are exported regionally.  
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The harvest season is known as pasang besar, a period based on the monthly lunar 
cycle. There are two harvest seasons per lunar cycle (approximately two per month), 
when the tides are at their strongest. Work is intensified during this period because it is 
when the most anchovies are harvested, leaving very little time for rest. The increased 
harvest also means that processing work is intensified, as anchovies must be 
processed (boiled and dried) shortly after they are collected.  
 
Jermals rose to prominence as a means of anchovy fishing in the 1970s and remained 
popular through the early 2000‘s. During the height of their prominence in the 1990s, 
research placed the number of active jermals between 395 and 800 with an estimated 
8000 workers, approximately 75 percent of whom were children.109 The industry is now 
in steep decline. Verité field research found that there were 12 remaining jermals in 
2010, with a total of 62 workers. While this number is not static, it seems clear that the 
overall trend in the number of jermal workers slants sharply down. 
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According to key informants, nearly all extant jermals in North Sumatra were 
constructed in the 1970s and 1980s (during the peak of the industry). The wood in these 
structures is now old and rotting.  
 
The declining incidence of jermals is attributed to several concomitant factors. First, the 
President approved the National Plan of Action on Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor (NAP) in 2002, which is a three phase plan to be implemented over 20 
years. The NAP was developed and implemented after heavy international attention to 
the problem of child labor on jermals.  
 
Beyond governmental interventions, the large tsunami that devastated Indonesia in 
2004 destroyed many of the jermals that existed at the time. Further, due to government 
crackdowns on illegal logging, the price of wood to rebuild these jermals was 
prohibitively expensive, according to jermal owners interviewed by Verité.  
 
These jermal owners interviewed by Verité said that operating a jermal was no longer a 
worthwhile venture for them. There was too much scrutiny from the government to avoid 
child labor and they could not repair their broken or rotting jermals. Further, they felt that 
boats were overfishing in the region and ―stealing‖ their anchovies. Several owners 
mentioned that their catch has been decreasing, and therefore their profit has been 
decreasing as well. It is difficult to attribute weight to each of these factors, particularly 
as the NAP was implemented and the tsunami occurred within a short timeframe. 
However, it is certain that, as one jermal owner told Verité interviewers, ―Jermals are 
dying.‖  
 
There are three types of actors associated with jermal fishing. The first is the owner of 
the jermal. The owner is normally absent from the jermal but hires a foreman or 
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supervisor (sometimes referred to as mandor) to manage operations on the jermal. The 
workers are the third category. Verité field visits found an average of five workers per 
jermal.  
 
All three categories of worker are male. Previously, workers were primarily children and 
juveniles, although currently, workers are primarily adult. (The reasons for this shift will 
be discussed later in this report.) Supervisors are adults, ranging in age from 40-58. 
More specific demographic findings will be discussed further in the Findings section.  
 
Forced labor on jermals was documented by KKSP, (Kelompok Kerja Sosial Perkotaan, 
"Working Group on Social Problems"), an Indonesian humanitarian group, that 
conducted a five-year investigation of labor conditions on jermals, interviewing workers 
on more than 140 of the platforms. Their research, published in the late 1990s, found 
that more than 75 percent of over 8,000 employees in the industry were children, one-
third of whom were under 14. The report put the number at ―at least 5,400 children, and 
probably many more‖ on the jermals.110 Several other reports highlighted child labor on 
jermals, including ―The Fisher Boys of Sumatra,‖ Independent (London), November 28, 
1998, and Children in Hazardous Work in the Informal Sector in Indonesia, Child 
Workers in Indonesia.111 112  
 
Based on the extent of child labor in jermals, provincial government agencies and 
NGOs in Sumatra initiated several interventions, including a Task Force on Child Labor, 
data collection on children working on jermals leading to their removal, vocational 
training, and denial of fishery business permits by any jermal owner caught employing 
child laborers. In 1999, the government ratified ILO Convention 105 (Abolition of Forced 
Labor) and began removing children from jermals.113 In 2000, the Local House of 
Representatives of North Sumatra accepted a cooperation agreement with the ILO that 
was later extended until July 2004 focused on this issue.  
 
Measures of the National Action Plan (NAP)  against child labor in Indonesia included 
awareness raising, education, and training of school dropouts; removal of child workers 
from offshore fisheries, drug distribution, and the footwear industry; a survey of child 
workers; and training of labor inspectors. According to information supplied by the 
government, 19,863 children were prevented from entering child labor and its worst 
forms and 10,922 were removed from such activities in 2006; 28,863 were prevented 
from entering child labor and its worst forms and 13,922 were removed from such 
activities in 2007.114 Under the NAP, national and local governments undertook an 
extensive monitoring process to identify and withdraw children working on jermals. The 
NAP also increased legal penalties for jermal owners found to be employing children, 
making the practice significantly less attractive to jermal owners, who, prior to the 
program, reportedly colluded with maritime officials to easily avoid any penalty.  
 
The NAP is currently in its second phase, which is set to last from 2008 to 2012.115 This 
phase is intended to continue the efforts of the first phase, while introducing new 
measures such as increased education for children, a targeted effort to prevent 5,000 
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children from entering domestic labor, and the withdrawal of 2,000 children already 
engaged in such labor. 116 
 
In coordination with the National Action Plan and the government of Indonesia, ILO-
IPEC implemented ―Fishing and footwear sectors programme to combat hazardous 
child labor‖ to eliminate the worst forms of child labor in jermals through: 
- Establishing a mechanism to withdraw children and prevent them from 
entering hazardous child labor; 
- Strengthening the capacity of national and community level agencies and civil 
society to eliminate child labor ; 
- Increasing livelihoods of parents, particularly women, to prevent children from 
entering child labor.117  
 
 
Research Findings  
 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in Jermal Fishing 
 
Researchers interviewed two groups of jermal workers: 56 current workers and 20 
former jermal workers. Researchers also spoke to 15 jermal supervisors. Due to the 
small physical space of the jermal, supervisors were present for all interviews with 
current jermal workers, which severely limited the ability of these workers to be honest 
about the conditions of their work. Interviews with former jermal workers were 
conducted to fill in details about these conditions, as well as mechanisms of coercion.  
 
Gender: All jermal workers and supervisors (and hence all interview subjects) are male.  
 
Age: Current workers interviewed reported ages ranging from 16 to 59 years with an 
average age of approximately 32, although researchers suspected that several current 
workers were younger than 16. Among current workers, three workers were under 18: 
one 16 year old and two 17 year olds. No tasks were specific to the workers under 18.  
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Based on interviews with former jermal workers and observation of current conditions, 
child labor was far more predominant in the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s. Former 
workers interviewed reported that they had worked on the jermals at ages ranging from 
seven - 29, with an average age of 14. The factors resulting in the change from a 
reliance on child labor to a heavy use of adult labor will be further discussed in this 
report.  
 
Jermal supervisors interviewed reported an age range of 46-65 years, with an average 
of approximately 53.  
 
Duration of Work: The average duration of work on a jermal differed between former 
and current jermal workers. Former jermal workers reported an average duration of 
jermal employment of under a year, at approximately 10 months. Current jermal workers 
reported an average employment duration of approximately 4 years. There were several 
outliers among current workers who reported periods up to 19 years working on jermals. 
The reason for the difference in duration of work between current and former workers is 
a matter of speculation to some degree, but experts interviewed felt that men who are 
currently working on jermals are there as an absolute last resort at making a living. 
Verité suspects that workers who report long-term periods of work on jermals are 
actually cycling between working on jermals, and periods away.118 That is to say, they 
have been working on and off for many years, returning when they need money, but 
have not spent that time continuously on the jermal.  
 
Educational Attainment and Alternative Livelihood: Jermal workers have low educational 
status. With the exception of one worker who reported completing junior high, all former 
and current workers reported elementary levels of education. Supervisors also have a 
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low educational status, with all supervisors interviewed reporting only an elementary 
level education.  
 
After working on a jermal, the former workers were eager to find alternate sources of 
livelihood, such as other types of fishing, farming, or working in small businesses. 
Interviews with former jermal workers suggest that those who stay on the jermal for 
longer periods, like the current adult workers, may lack access to alternate livelihoods, 
and therefore they are vulnerable to exploitation due to lack of economic options. One 
worker said, ―Only people with problems came and stayed on the jermal. They may be 
criminals who escape from society, people with problems who are rejected by 
family…Children or mentally handicapped people who were persuaded to [take] some 
job to do.‖ 
 
Origin: Jermal workers are originally from nearby provinces in North Sumatra. Villages 
of origin tend to be poor communities. The diverse ethnicities mirror the ethnicities 
found in this region. Ethnicities of jermal workers include Javanese, Bataknese, Malay, 
and Chinese.  
 
Village of Origin Number of Workers 
Aek Nabara 1 
Aek Loba Asahan 1 
Air Batu 4 
Ajamn 4 
Belawan 1 
Citra Makmur 1 
Deli Serdang 2 
Dolok Masihal 8 
Kisaran 3 
Lima Puluh 1 
Medan 2 
Padang Sidempuan 2 
Sei Barobang 7 
Sei Lang Buah 5 
Sigalaga 1 
Sigambal 1 
Simalungun 1 
Tanjung Balai 5 
Tembang 3 
Tinggi Rayes 1 
Tinuaan Batubara 1 
 
Jermal supervisors interviewed reported Javanese, Bataknese, Chinese and Banjar 
ethnicities. Villages of origin for supervisors interviewed include: Aek Nabara, Air Batu, 
Dolok Masihal, Kesaran, Medan, Sei Barombang, Sei Lang Buah, Selanggang, Tanjung 
Balai and Tinggi Raja.  
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Village of Origin Number of Supervisors 
Aek Nabara 1 
Air Batu 1 
Dolok Masihal 3 
Kesaran 1 
Medan 1 
Sei Barombang 4 
Sei Lang Buah 1 
Selanggang 1 
Tanjung Balai 1 
Tinggi Raja 1 
 
Mental Disability/Inability to Communicate: Verité research identified 10 workers who 
could not communicate verbally with researchers. It was the opinion of researchers that 
these workers had some type of mental disability. Because researchers were not able to 
communicate with these workers, it is difficult to provide further information. However, 
researchers were able to locate the family of a former jermal worker who was identified 
by his family as having a mental disability. A case study of that particular worker is 
presented in this report. Researchers were only able to identify definitively isolated 
incidences of this phenomenon, but individuals with disabilities may be particularly 
vulnerable to forced labor on jermals due to a potential inability to give informed 
consent. Further, these individuals are likely to have severely limited livelihood options, 
leaving jermal work as a last resort for these individuals and their families.  
 
Presence of Indicators of Forced Labor in Jermal Fishing 
 
While child labor on jermals has been virtually eradicated, Verité researchers note that 
the conditions for workers who remain are still problematic, and inherent in the physical 
structure of the jermals, as well as the intensive labor required.  
 
Forced, Excessive Overtime; Forced to Work On-Call: Working conditions on jermals 
are harsh. Most days, workers work ―day and night,‖ with breaks of only a few hours to 
sleep and rest. According to current and former workers interviewed as well as previous 
research, nets have to be lifted every four hours, increasing to every 2-3 hours during 
peak tidal periods. After lifting the nets, workers must immediately process fish due to 
the time sensitive nature of the resource. Workers reported that they worked 18-24 
hours during pasang besar.  
 
Limited Freedom of Movement and Communication; Constant Supervision; Isolation: 
The same conditions that made interviewing current workers difficult mean that there is 
little to no privacy for workers. They all live and sleep in the same small shack on the 
platform only returning to the shore at the end of their three month ‗term.‘ (Duration of 
stay is discussed in the following section). This lack of privacy, in combination with the 
long work hours, means that workers are constantly under scrutiny of the supervisors 
and never away from their gaze.  
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The physical isolation of jermals contributes to workers vulnerabilities to forced labor. 
Jermals are too far from coast to swim, and all former workers interviewed reported that 
they were expected to stay for three-month terms. This three-month period gave them 
no days off, and they remain on the jermal for the entire period. This physical location 
leads to an extremely isolated environment, where workers are cut off from nearly all 
communication and unable to leave the worksite until the end of their three-month term.  
 
Degrading Living Conditions: Workers live and work on the jermal platform. The 
platform is only roughly 10 by 15 meters in size. About two-thirds of the jermal is an 
open-air platform area. The other third has a hut-like structure which is used to process 
fish (through boiling, drying and sorting), store processed fish, and provide shelter for 
workers for living and sleeping. Fresh water is in scant supply. Food quality is quite 
poor. Workers report having little, poor quality sleep and spending the bulk of their 
three-month stint on the jermal hungry, thirsty and malnourished.  
 
Physical and Verbal Abuse and Harassment: Abuse and harassment are used as a 
means to coerce workers already physically confined on the jermals to work harder. 
One-hundred percent of former jermal workers reported extensive verbal harassment 
from the supervisor. These workers reported both that they had experienced verbal 
abuse first-hand, as well as witnessed the abuse of other children. Former jermal 
workers reported that verbal abuse was routinely used to motivate workers to work 
harder, as well as to punish them for mistakes. 
 
Several former jermal workers also reported physical abuse. As with accounts of verbal 
abuse, this was both experienced first-hand as well as witnessed. Also, as with 
accounts of verbal abuse, physical abuse was described as both a means to coerce 
workers to work harder and to punish them for mistakes.  
 
Researchers observed current workers to be predominantly closed, wary and 
intimidated in the presence of the supervisors, and thus it seems likely that conditions of 
harassment are ongoing.  
 
Withholding of Wages: Workers may also be bound to the jermals through a coercive 
payment system. All former jermal workers interviewed reported that workers only 
receive payment after the full three months, as supervisors are ―afraid of workers trying 
to run away.‖ Any worker who does manage to leave before the end of the three months 
is not paid at all. If workers were paid in cash while still on the jermal, they could try to 
flag down a nearby fishing boat and pay for escape. Further, several former workers 
reported a system in which full pay is not given unless the worker returns for a new 
three-month term or finds a replacement for himself. Current jermal workers still operate 
on the three-month term system, and workers are not paid until the end of their term.  
 
Wages: Salaries varied by worker, but current workers received a range of 200,000 IDR 
(22.27 USD) to 500,000 IDR (55.68 USD) per month. The workers who made 500,000 
IDR per month were assigned to boil the anchovies, which is considered a more skilled 
position.  
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Jermal supervisors received higher wages, with a reported average of 900,000 IDR 
(100.22 USD) per month.  
 
Other Issues of Concern Regarding Working Conditions in Jermal Fishing 
 
Deceptive Recruitment: The recruitment process for jermal workers also increases 
vulnerability to forced labor. Former jermal workers described a system in which, in 
order to leave the jermal and receive payment, they were required to find and recruit 
their own replacement. Sixteen of the former jermal workers interviewed reported being 
recruited through this system. The remaining four former jermal workers that were 
interviewed reported being recruited directly by the supervisor.  
 
Forty-five percent (9) of the former jermal workers interviewed reported specifically that 
they did not receive accurate information about wages and payment mechanisms when 
they were recruited. All former workers reported that they were surprised by at least one 
aspect of the work, most often the harsh conditions and lack of rest.  
 
Hazardous Work: Safety is a serious concern. Jermals in general are relatively fragile 
structures, and the remaining jermals are upwards of 15 years old. Workers reported 
fear that the jermal would collapse, as well as fear of waves and sharks. In interviews, a 
former jermal worker reported his first week on the jermal as particularly horrific; a 
strong storm hit the jermal, and the platform swayed and rocked violently with every 
gust of wind. Heavy rain made the platform slippery, and he feared he would fall into the 
open ocean. Although they were not able to talk openly with researchers, 10 current 
jermal workers made reference to the fact that they felt unsafe due to the physical 
location and condition of the platforms. 
 
In addition to physical danger concerns, workers suffer health problems stemming from 
the damp, unhygienic conditions. Nearly all current workers reported suffering from 
 P a g e  | 44 
colds and respiratory illnesses. Injuries were reported as well. Nutrition is also limited as 
workers are not allowed to eat any of the catch, but are instead provided with deliveries 
of dried fish and rice from the supervisor. Fruit and vegetables are virtually non-existent. 
 
Case Study – Tirto: No Alternative Livelihood 
Tirto was the third child of five siblings from a poor family in North Sumatra. At age 12, 
he had to leave school because his father could no longer pay his school fees. He 
initially worked at a poultry breeder, but even working 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. every day, his 
salary was so low that he didn‘t feel like it was worth it – his family couldn‘t afford 
regular meals, even with his additional salary. He quit this job because of the low salary, 
but felt guilty that he wasn‘t helping to support his family. He needed to lessen the 
burden on his parents somehow, thinking ―it would be great if I could make enough 
money to give some to my parents…but if I‘m at least supporting myself, my parents 
won‘t have to, and they‘ll be better off.‖ 
 
Around this time, Tirto‘s childhood friend, Satri, had just returned to their village from 
working on a jermal. Satri told Tirto that the jermal he worked on needed workers, and 
that Satri could get him a job there. Satri said that jermal work was good, because food 
and shelter are provided, so all the money workers make is profit. Therefore, he could 
send money to his parents. Tirto said this was exactly what he was looking for, so he 
sought permission from his parents and followed Satri back to the jermal.  
 
Upon arriving, Tirto found the jermal was not as he expected. His first night, there was a 
strong storm with blowing wind and heavy rain. He hadn‘t realized how far from shore 
the jermal would be, or how it would sway with each wave. He didn‘t realize fresh 
drinking water wouldn‘t be available or how hungry he would be. He was seasick all the 
time. He also didn‘t realize the nature of the work.  
 
Tirto and the other workers on the jermal were required to work 19 hours per day, 
pulling the nets up from the sea, then gathering, sorting, and drying the fish in a cycle 
that repeated every few hours.  
 
The days were so busy, and Tirto was so tired that he often made mistakes. For 
example, on one of his first days on the jermal, the workers had just pulled up a large 
batch of anchovies. They spread them on a plastic tarp on the deck to let them to dry in 
the sun, and then went to take a quick rest. Tirto was exhausted; he still felt sea-sick all 
the time and was barely sleeping at all, and he finally managed to fall into a sleep. The 
weather turned quickly from sunny to cloudy, and the anchovies needed to be picked up 
from the deck so they wouldn‘t get wet. Unfortunately, Tirto and several other workers 
were sleeping when the rain began falling and by the time they woke up, the anchovies 
were wet. The supervisor was angry and screaming at the workers. He told them they 
were stupid and needed to work faster. Tirto was afraid he would be hit, like the other 
children he saw being beaten.  
 
Tirto described himself as being ―depressed‖ during this time – he didn‘t see a way out. 
He was embarrassed at how much he missed his family and how much he cried. He 
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wanted to go home, but there was no way to get home: there was no boat and the shore 
was much too far to swim, especially when you thought about the sharks. Besides, even 
if Tirto could find a way off, maybe by flagging down a boat while the supervisor slept, 
he wouldn‘t make any money at all. Another boy on the jermal wanted to leave because 
he‘d received word that his father was very ill. The supervisor allowed him to leave with 
a passing boat, but he received no money for two months of work, as it was less than 
the customary three-month term.  
 
So Tirto stayed and fell into the pattern of the daily work. Days started at 4 a.m. and 
work continued throughout the day, with breaks only from 2-4 a.m. and 4-5 p.m., 
meaning that he regularly worked 18-20 hours per day.  
 
When his three months was finally completed, he was happy to return home and thrilled 
to see his family. He was paid the salary he was owed for three months, and his family 
was happy to receive the money. But then, after several weeks at home again, Tirto 
started to feel restless. He was bored, and the money he‘d brought home had already 
been spent. He again felt like a burden. He asked around in his village but couldn‘t find 
other work. Although he was horrified by the thought of going back, there didn‘t seem to 
be any other option. He returned to the jermal, and worked on and off on jermals for one 
and a half years.  
 
Case Study – Jermal Workers with Mental Disabilities: The Story of Jaka 
Verité research found evidence that people with mental handicaps may be particularly 
vulnerable to trafficking, as well as more vulnerable to exploitive working conditions than 
other jermal workers.  
 
While researchers were not able to have in-depth conversations with handicapped 
workers due to both the presence of the supervisors, as well as each individual‘s mental 
challenges, researchers were able to seek the family of one mentally handicapped 
jermal worker to more fully understand the mechanisms of how handicapped workers 
end up on jermals.  
 
The family of Jaka, an adult mentally handicapped worker, reported that Jaka had gone 
missing from their village and they had been unsuccessful in finding him. When his 
sister, Ani, went to the playground where Jaka liked to spend time, people living nearby 
said that someone had been around recruiting for jermals in Sialang Buah and that Jaka 
had gone with them. Jaka‘s family went to each jermal in Sialang Buah one by one, but 
when they found Jaka, he did not want to leave the jermal, and explained he was happy 
to have work and an income. When Jaka returned home after six months, he had 
virtually no earnings. 
 
After returning to the jermal, Jaka witnessed the jermal‘s deputy supervisor kill the 
supervisor of his jermal with an ax after being disciplined. The deputy supervisor then 
escaped from the jermal and was followed by the other frightened workers. Jaka was 
left behind. He was not found until several days later when the jermal owner came to 
check in on the jermal and found Jaka alone with the supervisor‘s corpse. 
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Small-Boat Anchovy Fishing in North Sumatra Province 
 
Introduction and Current Understanding    
 
 
Figure 6 - Verité photo, Small boat 
Fishing boat work is labor intensive and carries high physical risks for workers. The ILO 
has identified fishing as one of the most hazardous types of work.119 Fishing work in 
North Sumatra is no exception. Potential hazards include:120 
 Bad weather: Sudden gales, major storms, and heavy fog are significant causes 
of small boat accidents often resulting in capsizing, grounding, becoming lost, 
and collisions. Where weather warning systems and reliable radio 
communications with fishers at sea are poor or non-existent, casualties due to 
bad weather are more frequent. 
 Loss of power: This is a major cause of accidents. Many small fishing boats are 
powered by an outboard motor and do not carry either a spare engine or a sailing 
rig.  
 Fire on board: This is less common on board small fishing craft, as most of them 
are open boats or rafts where fire detection is usually instantaneous. However, 
fire on boats with outboard engines that carry large amounts of fuel is extremely 
dangerous.  
 Inadequate boat construction standards: Many small-scale fishing boats are not 
designed and constructed to sufficient safety standards. Frequently, the boats‘ 
design and construction are unsuitable for the conditions they are used in.  
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 Unsuitable boats: Starting in the latter decades of the twentieth century, small 
fishing crafts have been sailing farther offshore on prolonged fishing trips. Many 
of these craft, built for inshore fishing and day trips and often lacking basic safety 
equipment, are too small and otherwise unsuitable for offshore operations. 
Consequently, their crews‘ safety has steadily deteriorated.  
 Fisheries management: Certain management strategies may motivate fishers to 
increase their earnings by taking risks that they would not take otherwise. Such 
strategies involve, for example, limiting fishing time and area, and transferring 
and leasing catch quotas.  
 Economic hardship: Economic hardship, or even transitory financial difficulty, 
often causes fishers to take extra risk, when their better judgment might suggest 
otherwise. 
 Fishing operations: Trawling vessels of any size may capsize when their gear 
snags on a fastener because of obstacles on the sea bottom, while small seiners 
may capsize under the downward pressure of a large catch of fish ―sinking‖ 
during the last stage of net hauling. People can be swept overboard if caught up 
in nets or because of ropes running out while they are setting the gear. Various 
injuries may occur during fishing both from contact with fishing gear and deck 
mechanisms, and from bites, stings, and tail kicks by fish and other marine 
creatures. Wading and diving fishers are particularly at danger from large 
predators and various poisonous creatures. 
 
There are two primary types of anchovy boats found in North Sumatra. Large boats 
weigh more than 20 tons and have more on-board equipment. They are able to go on 
fishing trips of up to ten days. These boats are equipped with stoves and drums for 
cooking the newly caught anchovies, which is necessary to preserve quality. Larger fish 
that are picked up as by-product are normally frozen. Anchovy boats also have wide, 
flat roofs for drying anchovies.121 Most boats have storage space and an engine room. 
Personal space (including toilet facilities) is rarely available for workers, who sleep on 
the floor or in hammocks.122 Smaller boats lack room for storage and navigation 
systems – these boats only go out for one day at a time, so workers do not sleep on the 
boats.  
 
Small boats sell their catch daily to workshops or other processing facilities. Small boats 
dock in the afternoon or evening to unload their fish, where it is transported to the 
workshop. The workshops sort, clean, and dry the anchovies. Some process it further 
into paste, while others sell it to wholesale traders that are common in the port towns of 
Tanjung Balai and Belawan. These wholesaling operations are not owned by fishers 
themselves, but by other entrepreneurs and businessmen. Much of the dried anchovies, 
known locally as ‗ikan teri‘ is consumed domestically as it is an Indonesian staple 
food.123 Some is traded locally in the port towns themselves, while some is sold to 
retailers in Jakarta for distribution throughout the country. Key informants also noted 
that some may be regionally exported to Singapore and Malaysia.  
 
Large boats, which go out on longer expeditions, generally have space to dry the 
anchovies on the deck or roof of the boat. Fishers on large boats usually work about 20 
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days per month. (For workers on large boats, this means roughly two trips of ten days 
each out at sea.) Fishing takes place throughout the year. Fishing activities within each 
month follow local wisdom, guided by the lunar calendar and the tides. Fishing seasons 
are referred to in the vernacular as the ―good‖ season –called pasang besar; and the 
―bad‖ season, called pasang mati. During pasang besar, the fish are plentiful, and by 
extension, the harvest is generally successful. While fishers on small boats pay 
attention to the lunar calendar, they are also generally guided by the weather and 
determine on a daily basis whether or not to go out, so the number of fishing days per 
month can be variable. 
 
Bad weather can hamper the ability to earn a living. According to a January 2012 news 
article, recent bad weather has increased the cycle of indebtedness among fishers. 
―When the high tide season like nowadays, we owe to the loan shark who used to buy 
our catch to survive," said a fisherman in Wedung District. He said he would repay the 
debt after the bad weather passed. ―Every fishing season, we sell the catch to the loan 
shark who has given the debt even though the price is often regulated by them.‖124 
 
Tasks on fishing boats include: 
 drying fish; 
 lifting the nets;  
 guiding the boat/navigating;  
 maintaining back lamps; 
 managing the freezer box; and 
 sorting fish.  
 
Workers will be assigned to the above tasks based on strength, experience, and 
capability. Depending on the size of the anchovy boat, crews can include at least ten 
people. The boat crew is organized into a clear hierarchy. Most often, there is an 
admiral or captain (tekong). Depending on the size of the boat, there may also be a 
machinery worker (kuanca), manager (kepala kerja), and cook (tukang rebus). Verité‘s 
research found evidence of children working on anchovy boats. The tasks children 
participate in vary, and like adults, assignments are based on strength, capability and 
experience.  
 
The position with the most power and status is that of admiral, which exists on both 
large and small boats. He oversees the whole fishing trip, and decides, in conjunction 
with the boat owner, the duration of the expedition. Beneath the admiral is the manager 
who helps manage and supervise all workers‘ jobs according to their assignments. The 
manager, the admiral, and the boat owner have power in recruiting workers for each 
upcoming expedition. Therefore, it is in the workers‘ best interest to maintain a good 
relationship with their superiors in order to increase the likelihood of being recruited 
again for future work.  
 
While at sea, the admiral is a proxy for the boat owner, and thus has total authority over 
the other workers. In effect, the admiral runs the business. At the beginning of every 
trip, the boat owner will provide money to the admiral to fund the trip. This amount 
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varies, but through key informant interviews, researchers determined that for mid range 
to longer trips, the amount is about five million IDR (556.79 USD). The admiral uses this 
money to purchase necessities such as gasoline, oil, salt, ice block, and other 
provisions, as well as make loans to workers and their families. The admiral will get a 
bonus ranging from eight to 12 percent of total profit from the boat owner depending on 
the catch. 
 
Under this system, the admiral is effectively the only meaningful employer or boss of the 
workers. Because workers perceive that there are more potential workers eager to take 
their jobs, maintaining a good relationship with the admiral is highly important. Further, 
because the admiral has cash from the boat owner to fund the trip, he often becomes a 
source of loans to workers between trips. The nature of this debt will be further 
discussed in the findings section below.  
 
Working conditions on small fishing boats have been poorly documented. In 2004, the 
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor published Child Labor in 
Offshore Fishing, North Sumatra: A Rapid Assessment, detailing labor abuses on 
fishing boats in Indonesia. The report found that children and adults surveyed worked 
between ten and 12 hours per day, but up to 19 hours without sleeping or resting, and 
without safety gear or proper tools. Most respondents received no vegetables, fruit, or 
milk while at sea.125 The ILO also found that children involved in the fishing sector often 
sought jobs through informal networks such as friends or family members. Additional 
research by Markkannen made similar observations on working conditions in 2005, 
noting long working hours, child labor, lack of protective gear, and hazardous work 
among North Sumatran fishers. There has been limited previous reporting on the role of 
debt in fishing communities.126  
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Research Findings 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in Small-Boat Anchovy Fishing 
Age: Both children and adults are involved in anchovy boat fishing in North Sumatra, 
and both were interviewed for the study. One hundred and fifteen adult workers were 
interviewed. These adult workers ranged in age from 18 to 59, with an average age of  
32. 
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One hundred and twelve child workers were interviewed, ranging from nine to17 years 
of age, with an average age of 15.5. 127 The average age of entry into work for all child 
workers was approximately 14. The issue of child labor is discussed in more depth 
below. 
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Gender: All boat workers interviewed were male. Women and female children were 
found working in the fish processing industry, specifically in the anchovy drying 
workshops that are common in North Sumatra (see Appendix I).  
 
Place of Origin: Most workers come from the port provinces. Those who did not 
reported that they came to this area hoping to secure work in the fishing sector, and 
sought out admirals upon their arrival. They did not report being recruited by a labor 
broker. 
 
Entry into Sector and Alternative Livelihood Strategy: Many (25) adult workers had no 
previous experience besides fishing. Of workers who did have previous experience, 
jobs tended to be informal and insecure such as construction worker, driver, plantation 
worker, or subsistence farmer. The workers who had these jobs turned to fishing 
because there is a low barrier for entry. As one respondent said, ―It‘s easy to be a 
fisherman. It doesn‘t require any certificate or graduation.‖ Most fishers interviewed said 
that they had no other opportunity to make a living.  
 
Due to lack of other viable livelihood options, workers tend to stay in the fishing sector 
for relatively long lengths of time – 51 percent of adult survey respondents over 18 had 
been involved in fishing for over six years.  
 
Educational Attainment: Education levels among respondents were low. Of adult 
workers interviewed, 50 had an elementary school education, 36 had some junior high 
school, and 27 had some senior high school. 
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Among child workers interviewed who responded to the question, 75 had an elementary 
education, 24 had some junior high, and nine had some senior high school.  
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Presence of Indicators of Forced Labor in Small-Boat Anchovy Fishing 
 
Limited Freedom of Movement, Isolation, and Surveillance: Limited freedom of 
movement is inherent in boat work. Although workers did report that the boat would turn 
back to shore if a worker were to become gravely ill or injured, for the most part, 
workers are ‗stuck‘ on the boat for the entirety of the trip. There is little differentiation on 
the boats between work and living space and there is almost no possibility of privacy. 
This lack of privacy means that all workers, including children, are under constant 
supervision and surveillance from the boat admiral.  
 
Wages: The wage system is closely linked to the social hierarchy of the workers and is 
structured differently for those with more status. Admirals interviewed reported that they 
receive between eight to12 percent of the net profit from a trip (after expenses have 
been repaid to the boat owner). The exact percentage of the admiral‘s pay is structured 
to motivate the admiral to seek a larger catch. For example, according to one admiral 
interviewed, he receives an eight percent bonus for ―smaller‖ catches – i.e., when the 
boat owner‘s total profit works out to be less than 30 million IDR (3,328 USD). The 
admiral earns a ten percent bonus if the boat owner‘s profits are 30 to 40 million IDR 
(3,328 – 4,438 USD), and a 12-percent bonus if the total profit exceeds 40 million IDR 
(4,438 USD). Thus, the larger the catch, the larger the bonus. The admiral is paid after 
the boat owner sells the catch, which normally takes about three to four days upon 
returning from the fishing trip.  
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It should be noted that North Sumatra does have a minimum wage standard of 
approximately 905.000 a month (approximately USD 90).  Fishing is not generally 
excluded from minimum wage standards, but they are not commonly enforced.  
 
Regulations apply to boats over 5 tons. Our survey sample contained boats both over 
and under 5 tons. 
 
‗Regular‘ workers are paid per day, rather than in a ―bonus‖ system, like the admiral. 
Nearly all workers interviewed reported that they are paid 30,000 – 35,000 IDR (3.33 – 
3.88 USD) per day of fishing. Highly ranking technical workers such as the team 
manager, machinery worker, chef, and lamp keeper may also receive bonuses at the 
end of the trip. According to informants, the standard bonus for a team manager is 
300,000 to 500,000 IDR (33.29 – 55.47 USD) per trip in addition to his daily payment. 
The chef, the lamp keeper, the guide, and the drying keeper each receive a 50,000 IDR 
(5.55 USD) bonus per profitable trip. The salary structure was widely consistent among 
workers interviewed, even among those who worked for different admirals and boat 
owners. Several workers said that this structure is widely used so that workers avoid 
―jealousy‖ between workers on the same boat, as well to make wage structures 
somewhat predictable throughout the community.  
 
Large boat workers are paid at the end of every trip (assuming it was profitable) based 
on a daily wage, while small boat workers are paid at the end of the month. 
 
Many workers interviewed reported that if a trip is unsuccessful, and the catch is not 
enough to pay for the gasoline, etc., workers will not be paid. This means that there are 
occasionally some trips for which they are not paid at all, and that they are sharing the 
risk of the trip, while not necessarily sharing in the profits to the degree that an admiral 
does.  
 
Several workers reported occasions on which money had been deducted from their 
wages because some of the catch had gone missing. Because the admiral was not able 
to identify the specific guilty parties, he spread the cost of the fish across all workers 
and deducted it from their earnings.  
 
Because pay is withheld until the end of the trip (or, in the case of small boats, until the 
end of the month), workers expressed the pressing need to maintain a positive 
relationship with the admiral. The admiral is effectively the only meaningful boss to the 
workers. In spite of a daily wage, the workers must continue to perform efficiently for the 
sake of ensuring future employment. In addition, the nature of a worker‘s relationship 
with his admiral is crucial for securing monetary loans, as the admiral can use money 
from the boat owner to provide loans for workers. Most loans normally range from 
50,000 to 200,000 IDR (5.55 to 22.19 USD), and they most often are used to purchase 
necessities (such as food) for families before the fishers leave for an expedition.  
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The Cooperative Alternative 
For many workers in coastal North Sumatra, there are few livelihood alternatives to the 
fishing industry. But some fishers have found ways to make the market work better for 
them. During the course of research into boat fishing, researchers became acquainted 
with members of ―Perserikatan Nelayan Sumatera Utara‖ an independent, cooperative 
fishers‘s association near the port of Tanjung Balai. Members of the cooperative have 
their own small boats and work for a few hours in the morning and afternoon, when the 
fishing is best. Boats have simple nets and equipment, so their catch is not high, usually 
only one to two kilograms of shrimp, squid, or other small fish. Members built a simple 
hut that serves as a business center, where each day‘s catch is collected and weighed 
by two elected officers. Fishers‘s catches are weighed on the spot and the cooperative 
then pools the catch and sells it to a larger middleman who can give a better price than 
fishers could get if they tried to sell their catch individually. Fishers are then paid based 
on the weight of their catch. According to interviews with several members and co-op 
leaders, workers earn approximately 75,000 – 100,000 IDR (8.32 to 11.10 USD) per day 
of fishing, which is higher than boat workers. They also have more autonomy in decision 
making. If the weather is bad, for example, they can choose not to go out without 
worrying that they will hurt their relationship with the admiral. Workers also expressed a 
higher level of agency: Their earnings each day are based on a combination of their 
own hard work, luck and the market; but they are not dependent on the admiral or boat 
owners. Their catch is weighed in front of them, and co-op members expressed a high 
level of trust in the process. The barrier of course, is that each member must be able to 
afford his own boat. Even though boats are small and simple, it can take years to save 
up for one. 
 
Working Hours: Adult workers all reported working approximately 18 hours per day. 
While they are not actively working the whole time, they must be awake and available to 
work. Work begins at 6:00 a.m. Workers lift up nets, unload and sort fish, and drop nets 
back down. The cycle is repeated until midnight, when workers go to sleep for the 
remaining six hours of the day. Trips on larger anchovy boats are about ten days long. 
After a few days break, they are likely to go out again. Most fishers go out for two 10-
day trips per month.  
 
On smaller boats that can only go out for one day at a time, boats often leave in the 
afternoon, and then fish all night long.  
 
Debt: Over half of adult workers reported that they have debt. Nearly all who do take 
loans reported that they took them from the admiral. Most workers interviewed reported 
that they had other options (such as borrowing from a small store), but that taking loans 
from those sources would require that they pay back the loan with interest. When 
workers borrow from the admiral, it is considered an ―advance payment‖ against their 
next trip. That is, the full cost of the loan is taken out of their earnings from the next 
fishing trip and the advance payment does not necessarily result in exorbitant (or any) 
interest paid by the worker. Therefore, most workers are easily able to pay off their debt 
from trip to trip, particularly because the average loan amount is smaller than average 
total wages. All workers with debt reported that they took loans to supplement their 
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income for items such as food and other basic needs. These ―advance payments‖ do 
not result in exorbitant – or any – interest for the workers, and as such, accepting such 
payments does not necessarily render workers indebted long-term to their employers.  
 
Other Issues of Concern Regarding Working Conditions in Small-Boat Anchovy 
Fishing 
 
Child Labor: One hundred and twelve child workers were interviewed, with ages ranging 
from nine to 17, with an average age of 15.5. The average age of entry into work for all 
child workers was approximately 14. Most children (76) reported that they had been 
encouraged to enter the fishing sector by their parents. Nearly all children interviewed 
have parents or family members involved in the fishing sector.  
 
Children were involved in a variety of tasks. Assignments are made based on 
experience, capability and physical strength. Only boys work on boats, while girls work 
in workshops. Tasks reported by children included general boat crew (variety of tasks 
on board), workshop, sorting fish, mechanic, and handling nets. Of the children ages 
nine-17 interviewed, approximately 71 worked on the boat crews. The rest worked in 
workshops or in other auxiliary tasks.  
 
The following chart explains the breakdown of assignments of children interviewed who 
provided specific information about the tasks in which they are involved: 
 
Age  Activity Count 
9 Boat crew 1 
10 Workshop  1 
11 Boat crew 2 
Dock worker 1 
12 Boat crew 2 
Dock worker 1 
13 Boat crew 2 
Dock worker 6 
14 Boat crew 3 
Dock worker 4 
15 Boat crew 13 
Dock worker 7 
Workshop 1 
16 Boat crew 10 
Dock worker 4 
Workshop 2 
17 Boat crew 38 
Dock worker 6 
Workshop  4 
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Boat fishing is hazardous work, and children working in the sector can be considered to 
be engaged in a worst form of child labor.128 Children interviewed reported that they had 
fears about waves and storms and were afraid of large sea creatures such as sharks.  
 
While workshop labor may present fewer physical hazards, anecdotal evidence 
(provided in Appendix 1) suggests that child workers in workshops may work 
excessively long hours, including hours overnight, which is considered hazardous and 
therefore a worst form of child labor.  
 
Limited freedom of movement is inherent in boat work. All workers, including children, 
are under constant supervision from the admiral. Child workers, in particular, described 
being yelled at by the admiral as an inducement to work harder or to reprimand them for 
mistakes.  
 
Approximately 25 child workers said that they take loans from the admiral. Children with 
debt also reported a system in which they take loans as ―advance payment‖ and their 
debt is deducted from their earnings from the next trip. 
 
Case Study – Wayan: Child Worker on an Anchovy Fishing Boat  
Wayan is 16 years old and works on a 25-ton fishing boat. He has been doing this for 
almost a year. Wayan left school to work on fishing boats when he first turned 16. 
Wayan‘s father encouraged him to work because he was afraid Wayan was hanging out 
with a ―bad crowd‖ and would become a delinquent. His hope was that by working hard, 
his son would turn into a responsible adult.  
 
Wayan does not know the boat owner; he was recruited by the admiral. Like the other 
workers, he has no formal contract with the boat owner; instead, his employment is 
based on the common understanding of the terms of fishing work in the area.  
 
Wayan‘s job requires a large amount of physical strength and endurance. His boat sails 
for nine or ten days at a time. He wakes up every morning at 6:00 a.m. and begins 
casting heavy nets. At around 9:00 a.m., already up for three hours, workers begin 
lifting the heavy nets out of the ocean. It takes about an hour to lift and empty all the 
nets, and by 10:00 a.m., they are ready to cast them again. While they wait to lift the 
second round of nets, they sort the fish from the first round, determining which 
anchovies should be boiled, which should be salted, and which fish caught in the net 
should be frozen. They process the fish as they go.  
 
All of those activities are repeated again and again until midnight. Around this time, they 
will stop working for the day and take a rest. They will wake again early the next 
morning to be ready for work by 6:00 a.m. Overall, Wayan and all the crew members, 
regardless of their ages, have to work for 18 hours per day.  
 
Even though Wayan is underage, he is treated just like the adult crew members and 
keeps their hours. Like the other workers, Wayan is paid 33,000 IDR (3.66 USD) per 
day of the trip. Even if they work especially hard (such as during the harvest season of 
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March through September) and earn a large catch, his pay is the same. Meanwhile, the 
admiral and the supervisor are paid a bonus if they make a big catch. Wayan says the 
supervisor often screams to get the crew to work harder.  
 
Wayan feels this payment system is unfair, but also feels that there would be no benefit 
from complaining. There are plenty of other people who want to work in the fishing 
sector, so if Wayan or his crewmates complain, they could be easily replaced. Wayan‘s 
primary concern is to prove to his admiral that he is a good worker so he will continue to 
get asked to go on trips.  
 
During his first days at sea, Wayan got sea sick because of the strong waves in a storm. 
Even after almost a year working on boats, he is still frightened of storms; he once saw 
a fellow crew member get swept overboard. 
 
Hazardous Work: Health and safety concerns are inherent in boat fishing. The sea itself 
is unpredictable, and the integrity of the sea craft varies. Many of the workers 
interviewed, including adults and children, reported that they had fears about waves and 
storms. Workers who are injured must pay for their own medical treatment. In some 
cases, boat owners help with these costs.  
 
Case Study – Dennys: Adult Anchovy Boat Worker Sustains Serious Injury  
Dennys is 45 years old. He works as a technician on a large 28-ton anchovy boat with 
30 crew members.  
 
Dennys has been working in fishing for 20 years. He has been on his current boat for 
the past four years. As a technician, Dennys‘s salary is slightly higher than regular crew 
members: Most crew members are paid 35,000 IDR (3.88 USD) per day of the trip, but 
he is paid 50,000 IDR (5.55 USD) because he has higher skills. His salary is not 
guaranteed. If there is bad weather, or the boat owner calls a trip back for another 
reason, he may receive little or no salary.  
 
Two years ago, the boat on which Dennys was working stopped in the middle of the 
sea. Trying to fix the motor, two of his fingers were crushed, causing him to be 
hospitalized in severe pain for several days. He ultimately lost his fingers. The boat 
owner heard of his plight and helped pay a portion of his medical costs, but the rest was 
Dennys‘s responsibility. Dennys felt this was unfair, since he was injured while working 
to make a profit for the boat owner. But Dennys feels that if he asks for further financial 
assistance, it could sour his relationship with the boat owner and he might not be 
allowed to work for him again.  
 
Dennys‘s entire livelihood, especially now that he has an injured hand, rests upon 
maintaining a good relationship with the boat owner. He also needs to maintain a good 
relationship with the admiral so that he can continue taking ―advance payments‖ on his 
salary between trips. He can borrow 50,000 IDR (5.55 USD) before each trip from the 
admiral.  
 
 P a g e  | 58 
Verbal Abuse: Because the admiral‘s pay structure is entirely based on the size of the 
catch, he has strong motivation to be aggressive in going after large catches. Child 
workers, in particular, described being yelled at by the admiral as an inducement to 
work harder or to reprimand them for mistakes.  
 
Lack of Contracts and Benefits: None of the workers interviewed had any type of 
contract or employment agreement with the admiral or the boat owner. Nor did any of 
the workers receive benefits such as medical insurance. If a worker is injured while 
fishing, the admiral or boat owner may cover some of his medical costs, but this is 
entirely by discretion. This adds another layer of dependency between the workers and 
the admiral. One worker described the need to stay in the good graces of the admiral as 
an informal form of health insurance. (See also the case of Dennys.) 
 
While no aspects of the employment relationship are formalized, all fishers interviewed 
reported that they knew the terms of employment before they started and that the actual 
conditions were as they expected.  
 
Blast Fishing in South Sulawesi Province 
 
Introduction and Current Understanding 
 
Illegal fishing represents a large segment of all fishing activities in Indonesia.129 While 
there are several types of illegal fishing in Indonesia, including all 
unregistered/unlicensed fishing, trawl-net fishing130 and cyanide (or ‗poison fishing‘),131 
this report is concerned with fishers involved in blast fishing. 
 
Blast fishing is widely practiced to catch fish quickly with fewer costs to the fishers. 
Because it is targeted at schooling reef fish, fishers are able to catch entire schools of 
fish with one or two bombs.  
 
In current blast fishing practice, fishers throw bombs made from ammonium nitrate 
mixed with fertilizers and fuel oil into schools of fish. The impact of the bomb varies 
depending on size. Small bombs (packed in a 150-ml bottle) will have an impact 
covering two to three square meters of water. A large bomb – packed in a one-liter 
bottle – can affect 10 to 20 square meters. The bottles are sometimes weighted to sink 
deeper into the water. A waterproof wick, which is one of the more difficult components 
to obtain because they are illegal in Indonesia,132 is added. Fishers watch for schools of 
fish in coral reefs or in open water then move their boats to approximately five meters 
from the school. They then light the wick and throw the bomb into the water. Fishers 
dive into the water after the blast to collect the fish that are killed or stunned by the blast 
from the explosion. Divers either free dive or use an air compressor for oxygen.  
 
The most common catch from blast fishing is a mix of fulier, scad, and sardines; 
grouper, snapper, surgeonfish, and rabbitfish are rarer.133 Previous research has 
attributed increasing demand for these types of fish to increased demand for exports 
and well as the expansion of tourism in the area.134 Fish processing companies with 
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access to international markets have opened in the provincial capital, Makassar, where 
fish harvested through blast fishing are sold to middlemen.  
 
Blast fishing is common in many parts of Indonesia. It was first introduced to Indonesian 
fishers during World War II by Japanese soldiers with excess explosives. Its popularity 
waned due to lack of explosives, then rose again during the 1950s when soldiers 
rebelling against the Sukarno administration used several islands in the Spermonde 
archipelago as a base. It has become more popular in recent years.135 The increase in 
blast fishing is tied to increasing demand for reef fish at the same time as fish 
populations are dropping. Demand for these types of fish has increased as new fishing 
ports were established in South 
Sulawesi,136 and fish processing 
companies with access to 
international markets opened in 
the provincial capital, where fish 
harvested through blast fishing 
are sold to middlemen.137 One 
report estimates that more than 
75 percent of fishers in South 
Sulawesi practice blast 
fishing.138  
 
Coinciding with the rise in 
demand, fish biomass has 
dwindled throughout the 
Spermonde archipelago due to 
the destructive nature of blast, 
cyanide, and trawl-net fishing. 
Blast fishing is particularly 
environmentally destructive, 
because it not only kills the 
targeted fish, but immature fish 
and the surrounding coral as 
well.139 The type of blast fishing 
practiced in Indonesia ―shatter[s] 
all corals within a one to five 
meter radius and kill[s] marine 
organisms up to a radius of 77 
meters,‖ leaving the reef unable 
to support marine life due to 
―decreased habitat 
complexity.‖140 Since these 
forms of illegal fishing are relatively efficient and ―yield from a single, well-placed soda 
bottle bomb will earn an Indonesian fisherman over five times the average worker‘s 
daily salary,‖ they become more and more attractive to fishers who cannot make a 
livable income using more traditional methods due to dwindling numbers of targeted 
Figure 7 -Siry, Hendra Y., Marking Decentralized Coastal Zone 
Management Work in Indonesia: Case Studies of Kabupaten, Konawe, 
and Kabupaten Pangkajene Dan Kapulauan. Australian National 
University, Thesis, 2009 
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fish. 141 Blast fishing represents a last chance for fishers to provide for their families 
through fishing when more traditional methods fail. This creates a spiral in which stocks 
are further depleted, causing an increase in more intensive fishing methods.  
 
The Spermonde archipelago, where research was conducted, has a total area of 40,000 
hectares and consists of over 100 small islands. The islands are located off of the coast 
of South Sulawesi in the Makassar Strait, and about 54 are populated.142 Most have 
only been populated since World War II.143 The spread-out nature of these islands, 
combined with a low population density, make them hard to patrol or monitor.  
 
Kodingareng, the island in which research was carried out, is one of the small 
Spermonde islands. The island is administratively part of the Makassar government 
district. The island is small (about 48 square kilometers). The population of the island is 
approximately 4,200.144 The education level is low, with most residents having only an 
elementary level education.145 Previous research found approximately 20-30 blast 
fishing bosses (juragang), each with approximately six workers (sawi).146 Other 
livelihood options on the island include more traditional types of fishing, small-scale 
vendor business, civil service, and construction.147  
 
While fishing is conducted during both the East and West Seasons, the East Season is 
known to have calmer, better conditions for fishing, so the sector is generally more 
active during that time. Fishing also occurs during the West Season. The seasonal 
aspect to fishing in the Spermonde islands means that the work cycle is inconsistent. 
Fishers may go through periods of heavy work in the East Season, only to have periods 
of little to no work in the West Season – necessitating purchasing goods for daily needs 
through credit, which will be discussed later in this report.  
 
On a daily basis, the preferred time for blast fishing is early morning, so fishers leave 
shore around sunrise. Small-medium size ships will operate until approximately 10:00 
am when the fish market opens. Fish prices at market go down as the day goes on and 
supply increases as more boats come in, so arriving early at the fish market is 
advantageous. Many small-medium sized ships that cannot go out for multi-day trips will 
make a return trip in the early evening with fish to sell the next day at market. Blast 
fishing rarely occurs at night as daylight is required to site the schools of fish, and to 
collect them from the sea-floor.  
 
 
 
 
Blast fishing in South Sulawesi is closely tied to social structures. The people living in 
Spermonde are primarily ethnically Bugis and Makassar. Across both ethnicities, social 
organization is heavily dependent on a ‗patron-client‘ relationship that has a long history 
throughout South Sulawesi.148 While this mode of social organization is relevant to the 
general population, it plays out in specific ways in the population engaged in blast 
fishing. 
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There are two main types of actors engaged in blast fishing. The boat owner is the 
‗boss‘ (referred to as the juragang) and provides necessary materials such as 
explosives. The fishers themselves are known as the sawi.  
 
Fishers who participate in blast fishing activities tend to live in somewhat insulated 
communities, often centered around the juragang. (This is due largely to the remote 
nature of the Spermonde islands, and is reinforced by the engagement in an illegal 
activity for livelihood.)  
 
The relationship between the juragang and sawi conforms to the general pattern of 
patron-client relationships. The juragang uses his higher social status and economic 
resources to procure contraband materials through access to highly protected 
networks.149 A juragang’s means of procuring these materials are kept secret both 
because the materials are banned, but also to maintain the juragang’s status within the 
community. Because sawi do not have access to these networks, and few to no 
alternate livelihood options, they are completely reliant on the juragang. The juragang 
provides an important source of credit within the community, and the sawi frequently 
borrow money to pay for various livelihood needs and larger events such as weddings 
or funerals.  
 
Because blast fishing is banned in Indonesia, evading the attention of police and the 
Navy is a primary activity of blast fishers, who can target illegal fishing operations for 
bribes. Juragang set aside money to pay bribes to police officers each month. This is 
another way in which the sawi is dependent on the resources of the juragang. If boats 
are caught by other patrols, they are forced to either pay a bribe on the scene or to risk 
being arrested and going to court. If sawi are arrested while engaging in blast fishing, 
the juragang takes responsibility for paying their bail and use his political networks and 
connections to free the sawi. In some cases, juragang can secure ―connections‖ with 
government officials, essentially paying a bribe to protect his crew from harassment.150 
 
Finally, the juragang connects fish caught by the sawi with the mainland market, thereby 
acting as a middleman in the sale of the fish and securing of profit.  
 
In turn, and partially due to these multiple layers of dependencies, sawi tend to be very 
loyal to their juragang. Sawi may frequent the juragang‘s house to participate in social 
activities like watching television.151 They may even participate in chores at the 
juragang’s house as a way of demonstrating loyalty – however these activities are not 
―required‖ or ―forced.‖ How this relationship plays out relative to the indicators of forced 
labor will be explored later in this report.  
 
As regards the fishing process, there are several roles on a typical blast fishing boat:152  
 The captain (pandega) is the leader of the boat, and often the juragang himself. 
Sometimes, the juragang will hire someone else from the island to captain the 
boat. If someone besides the juragang is hired, he is generally an experienced 
fisherman. The captain has ultimate responsibility for all aspects of the voyage.  
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 The observer (patula) scans the sea to determine the best place for fishing 
activities.  
 Paddlers paddle the off-board lepa-lepa (canoe-like vessel) to the location from 
which the bomb will be thrown.  
 The igniter (pa’tunu) ignites and throws the bomb as directed by the patula. 
 The helmsman (paguling) guides the boat‘s movements using a compass.  
 The divers (paselang) dive to the ocean floor to collect fish after the bombing. 
Paselang are primarily young, unmarried men. As the most dangerous, least 
desirable job, this is seen as the entry to blast fishing. Children are often called 
upon to perform this job as their lungs are viewed as the healthiest.  
 Many boats also carry a machine technician (bas) who cares for the engine and 
compressor.  
 
There are also sawi who act as ―jack-of-all-trades‖ and help where they are needed, 
rather than specializing in one specific task. In fact, most sawi are able to perform 
several tasks, and although they may have a specialization, they are flexible and 
capable of taking on other tasks, having learned through observation and experience. 
The sawi with the most specialized skills find themselves higher in an informal hierarchy 
among crew members.153 
 
Fish caught with blast fishing methods are the property of the juragang who supplied the 
materials and the boat. He uses his connections to sell to middlemen (known as 
pabaloang or panngawa), or bypasses the middlemen and sells directly to fish markets 
on the mainland, most commonly fish markets in Rajawali and Paotere.154 
 
The majority of blast fishing harvest is destined for the domestic market, and very little 
of the harvest ends up for export. This is due to the poor physical condition of the fish, 
which tend to be broken and easily deteriorate. There is no reliable data available on 
the composition of the target market for fish harvests from blast fishing.155 The blast 
fishing marketing chain is shown below. 
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The blast fishing marketing chain.  
Source: M. Chozin, 2008, Illegal but Common: Life of Blast Fishermen in the Spermonde Archipelago, 
South Sulawesi, Indonesia  
 
Behind these fishers in the field is a network of material suppliers [for explosives or 
poison], security back-ups, fish collectors, fish marketers, and, in some cases, fish 
exporters.156 
 
Previous reports on blast fishing have focused on the environmental aspect; and in 
general, information on this type of fishing practice is scarce. Verité used one 
publication in particular as a basis of understanding for its research in the Spermonde 
Islands: the dissertation of Muhammad Chozin at Ohio University. Published in 2008, 
this dissertation provides a solid basis of information about the supply chain for blast 
fishing in the Spermonde Islands, as well as an accounting of the actors involved in the 
practice, particularly on the island of Kodingareng. Verité also consulted directly with 
Chozin during the rapid appraisal and research design phases of the project.  
 
Research Findings 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Respondents in Blast Fishing 
 
Gender: Both male children and adult men are involved in blast fishing.  
 
Age: Verité researchers interviewed a total of 64 respondents, including 22 child and 
juvenile workers ranging in age from nine to 17, with an average age of 14.5; and 42 
adults ranging in age from 18 to 52, with an average age of 30. The average age of 
entry into blast fishing for child workers interviewed was 12. 
 
 P a g e  | 64 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
18-22 23-26 27-30 31-34 35-38 39-42 43-46 50+
Age Distribution of Adult 
Respondents  
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Age Distribution of Child 
Respondents  
 
 
Origin: Workers were all relatively local – no workers reported migrating to work in the 
blast fishing sector.  
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Educational Attainment: The average level of education of respondents was low with 
majority of workers reporting an elementary education level. 
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Alternative Livelihood: For most adult workers interviewed, blast fishing was seen as 
one of very few options for livelihood. The lack of alternate livelihoods positions blast 
fishing as relatively desirable. While several adult workers had previous occupations 
(five in construction, one in selling firewood), most had only ever worked in fishing. 
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Entry into Sector: Nearly all adult workers who responded (41 out of 42) explained that 
they had chosen this line of work due to a combination of lack of alternatives and the 
need to earn a livelihood. Some also described their choice of employment in more 
‗positive‘ terms (i.e., they like the work). All adult respondents also had friends or family 
members involved in illegal fishing, pointing to the primacy of this sector as a livelihood 
provider. Other means of fishing are practiced on the island, but due to resource 
depletion (itself caused by illegal fishing), blast fishing is the most economically efficient 
fishing method.  
 
Of adult sawi who reported their means of recruitment, 26 found their jobs through the 
juragang (either recruited by the juragang or approached the juragang for work); three 
reported finding the job through family (such as brother or uncle); and two found the job 
through a friend. Of child sawi interviewed, twenty-five (out of a total of 26) of the child 
workers were encouraged to enter blast fishing by their parents, who saw it as a good 
opportunity to make a living. 
 
Presence of Indicators of Forced Labor in Blast Fishing  
 
Pre-existence of dependency relationship with employer: Juragang provide sawi with 
access to credit, materials, and protection from arrest. Juragangs are leaders in the 
community and traditionally have high levels of social capital.  
 
Physical Violence (and Verbal Abuse): Nine children interviewed reported being 
physically hit as a form of punishment. All but three of the children interviewed reported 
being verbally ―scolded‖ by their supervisor, for infractions such as making mistakes or 
working too slowly. 
 
Wages: According to interviews, earnings for sawi are determined by the volume of 
catch on any given trip, as well as the market rate secured by the juragang who sells 
the catch to a middleman. After receiving payment, the juragang first pays off his 
investments (materials, gasoline, ice, etc.). The rest of the profit is divided in half, with 
half being retained as profit by the juragang and half being divided among the workers.  
 
Workers interviewed reported average monthly earnings of 423,809 IDR (46.75 USD). 
Earnings are determined by catch and are highly variable. Workers reported an average 
pay of 50,000 to 100,000 IDR (5.57 to 11.14 USD per trip.), with the number of trips per 
month being highly variable depending on the season and weather conditions. Child 
workers are generally paid at a slightly lower rate; child workers interviewed reported a 
wage of 10,000 – 100,000 IDR (1.14 to 11.14 USD) per trip.  
 
Wages were generally paid as expected, however, both child and adult sawi reported 
that if any given fishing expedition had been unproductive, and the amount of the catch 
was not enough to cover expenses such as gasoline and ice, they would not be paid. As 
the coral reefs continue to be destroyed, it is more and more likely that fishing trips will 
result in no pay to the workers.  
 
 P a g e  | 67 
Working Hours: Work hours were highly variable. Sawi interviewed reported daily hours 
of three to 17 hours, with an average fishing trip of ten hours. Length of trip is 
determined by the size of the boat. Larger boats are able to accommodate longer trips, 
as fish can be packed on ice and stored. However, as discussed previously, these 
hours are highly dependent on the seasonality of fishing; and depending on weather 
conditions and tides, fishers may go for long periods without fishing at all. They are 
more likely to take loans from their juragang to cover living expenses during these 
periods.  
 
Although multi-day fishing expeditions inherently mean that workers are isolated on a 
boat for that period of time, all workers reported that, if it was absolutely necessary (for 
example, if someone became very ill), the juragang would return the boat to shore.  
 
Indebtedness: 35 (out of 42) of the adult sawi reported taking loans from their juragang 
to pay for daily living expenses (food, clothing), holiday/special events (such as 
weddings, funerals or the Eid holiday), or for luxury purchases such as technology (cell 
phones, televisions) that are becoming more and more common on the island of 
Kodingareng. Although the number of loans that any given sawi might take varied, most 
took several loans per year. No sawi reported having to pay interest to their juragang, 
and no sawi reported that providing collateral was a necessary condition of taking a 
loan.  
 
With the exception of one worker who said he could take a loan from a pawn shop, all 
sawi reported no alternative sources of credit other than the juragang.  
 
Of the adult sawi workers who reported debt, the average debt reported was 
approximately 900,000 IDR (98.48 USD). However, most sawi interviewed did not know 
the exact total of the debt to their juragang and told researchers that they were only 
estimating their response. These workers reported that the juragang keeps track and 
―deducts it gradually from their salary,‖ so it can be hard to tell when a debt is 
completely paid off. Thus, workers may be continuously in debt, while still bringing 
home most of their earnings.  
 
All sawi with debt to their juragang reported that they were required to pay back their 
debt to the juragang if they wanted to quit, move, or work with another juragang. Most 
workers reported that they were able to quickly pay off this debt if they needed to. While 
most workers did report no loan interest, and no set period of repayment, the worker 
interviewed with the largest debt, 5 million IDR (556.79 USD), reported a four-month 
loan duration, with accruing interest.  
 
Because relationships with juragang are based in loyalty, sawi interviewed said that 
they could hypothetically move to another juragang if they wanted to, but that such a 
situation would be unlikely. They would lose a longstanding relationship, and the 
juragang would ―no longer trust [us] when [we] moved back,‖ said one worker 
interviewed. Another worker interviewed said that if someone stopped paying his debt or 
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went to work for another juragang ―the juragang would be mad, but there is nothing he 
could do.‖ 
 
Workers reported that if someone were to die while still holding debt, the juragang 
would likely forgive the debt and not require family members to work to pay it off.  
 
Other Issues of Concern Regarding Working Conditions in Blast Fishing 
 
Hazardous Activities: Safety in blast fishing is a serious concern. Nineteen children 
interviewed reported feeling fear at work. The most common fears were paralysis, being 
knocked out of the boat by waves, and sharks. Children are most often called upon to 
act as divers. Adults interviewed in the community reported that children were better 
suited to diving due to better physical stamina and lung capacity. Fourteen children 
interviewed reported that they act as divers. Divers rely on air compressors used to 
inflate tires while diving to great depths, which can be an inadequate form of receiving 
oxygen. Thus diving too deeply can result in paralysis or ―the bends‖. All child 
respondents knew someone who had been paralyzed while diving. Pressure on the ear 
drums during dives can also lead to hearing loss, although this was unreported among 
sawi interviewed.157  
 
The bombs themselves are also hazardous, particularly for more inexperienced sawi, 
including children. Sawi face the danger that an improperly made bomb could explode 
while still on the boat, or in the hands of one of the crew. Workers reported knowledge 
of other fishers in the community who had lost fingers this way.   
 
Child Labor: Both male children and adult men are involved in blast fishing. Interview 
respondents included 22 child and juvenile workers ranging in age from nine to 17, with 
an average age of 14.5.  The average age of entry into blast fishing for child workers 
interviewed was 12.  
 
The most common means of entry into blast fishing for children interviewed was seeking 
out employment through a juragang that they had connections with, either through 
family or friends. Twenty-five (out of a total of 26) of the child workers were encouraged 
to enter blast fishing by their parents, who saw it as a good opportunity to make a living. 
In fact, adult sawi interviewed who also had children who work as sawi, described that 
work as a sawi was a ―positive‖ option for their children and that working as a sawi was 
―better than playing around and not attending school.‖ Education past the elementary 
school level is generally seen as a waste of time, as teachers are often absent and 
illiterate themselves. Parents also stated that work as a sawi was advantageous 
because it was a means of livelihood that sons could start with little economic output 
(start-up costs) and in which skills could be learned directly from their fathers. Most (25 
out of 26) children interviewed had friends who worked as sawi, before they got involved 
in the sector, which suggests that working as a sawi is seen as a relatively desirable 
option.  
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Children interviewed seemed to have some degree of knowledge regarding the 
conditions of work before they started, which is not surprising, as all of them reported 
friends or family members who also worked as sawi at the time of their recruitment. Ten 
children reported having knowledge of the type of work before they started, and each of 
those children reported that the knowledge they had of the job beforehand proved to be 
accurate once they started. However no children reported having knowledge about 
wages or salary before starting.  
 
Child workers interviewed reported participating in tasks including managing the air pipe 
(for those diving), rowing and diving. Children are favored for diving, which is particularly 
hazardous, because it is believed that their lungs are stronger.  
 
Six child sawi reported being in debt to their juragang, with reported debt averaging 
123,333 IDR (14.00 USD).  
 
 
Case Study – Adinda: Child Labor in Blast Fishing 
Adinda is 14 years old, and has been working as a sawi since he was nine. He left 
school two years ago. He comes from a fishing family – both his grandfather and father 
have worked in the sector. His parents felt that his only viable future would be as a sawi, 
as school past the elementary school level would not be useful in the long term and 
Adinda stated that he shared this sentiment towards continued education.  
 
Between the ages of nine and12, Adinda worked after school to assist the sawi in 
preparing for their next fishing trip. At age 12, upon leaving school, Adinda began 
working as a diver. He was told he would be well-suited for this task because his young 
lungs would have better capacity.  
 
Adinda stated that he is happy to have this job because he earns spending money for 
himself and because he helps support his family. He reported earning up to IDR 
250,000 per fishing trip. He knows that his family had debt to the juragang, but seemed 
unclear if some of his wages were going to pay the family debt.  
 
Adinda was aware of the risks of diving, including paralysis, but stated that these risks 
were worth it to him for the opportunity to earn a living.  
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Case Study – Netro and Paku: A Child’s Work Tied by Social Custom to a Father’s 
Debt 
Netro is a 16 year old boy who works as a sawi. Netro works as a diver and feels that 
his work is hazardous. He related to researchers the story of a time he was nearly hit by 
a bomb thrown by a friend. He is also afraid of being arrested by officials. Netro had 
dreamed of becoming a civil servant which is a respected position in his village. 
However, he cannot afford the advanced education that this job would require.  
 
His father, Paku, currently works as a sawi. Netro‘s late grandfather also worked as a 
sawi for the same juragang. On days when he goes out, Paku earns a salary of 
approximately 100,000 IDR per day, which is just barely enough to cover his family‘s 
daily needs. During the off-season or periods of bad weather, his salary is much lower, 
or even nothing. Paku is in poor health, so even in peak season, there are many days 
when he cannot participate in fishing expeditions. When Paku runs out of cash, he 
borrows money from his juragang. At this point, he is not certain of the current amount 
of his debt. After each trip that he makes, ―a little‖ is deducted to pay his debt, but this is 
not formally tracked anywhere.  
 
Netro began working for his father‘s juragang as a way to contribute to the family 
income. No deductions are made from his salary to pay for Paku‘s debt, and Netro 
himself is not indebted. However, Netro feels that because his father is still indebted to 
his juragang, it would be frowned upon by the community if Netro were to quit working 
as a sawi altogether, or to move to another juragang.  
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Conclusion  
 
This report has covered background information on Indonesia and the fishing sector; the 
methodology that was developed to study the presence of indicators of forced labor in 
particular areas of the Indonesian fishing sector; the presence of indicators of forced 
labor and other labor violations; and the factors that increase workers‘ vulnerability to 
labor exploitation. While these findings are not statistically representative, the report 
provides an overview of the indicators of forced labor and other forms of labor 
exploitation uncovered amongst fishers, as well as factors that increase workers‘ 
vulnerability to labor exploitation. 
 
Risk Factors for Indicators of Forced Labor Identified by the Research 
 
Fishing plays a crucial role in providing livelihoods to the many residents of Indonesia‘s 
coastal communities. However, Verité‘s research identified certain groups of workers 
that may be particularly vulnerable to exploitation: 
 
 Mentally disabled individuals were identified working on jermals. As these 
individuals and their families have few alternative livelihood options, work on 
jermals may be seen as a last resort. These workers are vulnerable above and 
beyond other individuals as they lack resources to advocate for themselves or to 
escape abusive situations.  
 Children were identified working in small-boat fishing and blast fishing. The types 
of work required in these sectors are often hazardous, and put children at risk of 
injury. Children interviewed reported two primary reasons for entry into the fishing 
sector. First, they wanted to help support their families. Second, continued 
schooling is often inaccessible because it is either unaffordable or because there 
is no decent school nearby. 
Verite also identified several predominant indicators that increased workers‘ 
vulnerability to forced labor or exploitation. 
 Debt and Low Earnings: Social systems and lack of access to capital can put 
workers at risk of exploitation, although they are not necessarily exploited in 
practice. Because many fishers live in extreme poverty, they rely on patronage 
relationships to provide them with capital for fishing and access to credit.  
While fishers express gratitude for the access and protection that their patrons 
(or boss) can provide, the relationship dynamic is often one of dependence.  In 
boat fishing in North Sumatra, anchovy fishers also often end up indebted to their 
boat admiral. While fishers often have alternate sources of loans, taking loans 
from the admiral is considered preferable as these loans are seen as ―advances 
on payment‖ and repayment is not charged with interest. These loans are 
generally a relatively small amount and do not effectively bind the workers to the 
admiral, although they do reinforce dependency on the admiral and reinforce the 
hierarchical, patron-like relationship. 
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In blast fishing, practiced in South Sulawesi, fishers known as sawi have multiple 
layers of dependency on their patron or boss, known locally as the juragang. 
Juragang are the center of the island communities, and much of a sawi‘s identity 
within the community is tied to the juragang for whom he works. Most sawi do not 
have direct access to materials for blast fishing, and instead rely on the 
juragang‘s networks to procure these contraband materials. Juragangs may also 
provide loans to the sawi who work for them. These loans, used for household 
necessities, as well as events such as religious holidays, weddings and funerals 
represent the only access to credit for the sawi. Collection on debts may be lax, 
with sawi paying off debts little by little over many years, and there is no 
accounting system. While there are few enforcement measures to ensure 
repayment of debt, there is a cultural expectation that a sawi will continue to work 
for his juragang to show loyalty and thanks for the loans he has been given.  
 
Low Earnings: Fisher‘s reliance on loans is exacerbated by low earnings. In the 
case of small boat fishing, fishers are paid by the day but higher status workers 
such as admirals are paid on a bonus system, depending on the volume of the 
catch. This means that the admirals are incentivized to induce the fishers to work 
harder and longer, but the fishers themselves will not share in the reward of a 
higher volume catch. On the other hand, if a trip is unsuccessful and no fish (or a 
low volume of fish) are caught, the workers may not receive their daily payment, 
meaning that they have a higher burden of risk without the possibility of higher 
reward. Wages for sawi in blast fishing are also extremely unpredictable and 
based on the volume of catch. Fishers utilize blast methods in an attempt to eke 
out a living through a more efficient fishing method, but with the ongoing 
environmental degradation from such practices, incomes will continue to 
decrease. Because fishers receive low wages, they are more likely to rely on 
their employers or supervisors for income smoothing loans, and more likely to 
enter debt.  
 
Isolation at Sea: Due to the nature of fishing, while fishers are on board vessels, 
they face some degree of isolation. This is particularly applicable in the case of 
jermals where workers may stay for up to three months. Once workers are on a 
vessel or platform, their freedom of movement is inherently limited, making them 
vulnerable to abuse from supervisors. Workers are also under constant 
surveillance while on board vessels or platforms.  
Health and Safety: All types of fishing ventures carry risk, and fishing has been 
identified as one of the most hazardous occupations as the sea is unpredictable 
and can be dangerous. Blast fishing carries the specific risks of explosive use, as 
well as the risk of paralysis from diving deep under the ocean without proper 
equipment.  
 
Overall, many workers expressed frustration at a lack of alternative livelihood. Many 
noted a desire to work in another sector, but lamented that due to a lack of alternatives, 
they would remain engaged in fishing.  
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Lessons Learned 
 
This research exposed some of the challenges of conducting research on hidden 
populations and vulnerable workers. These challenges faced included: 
 Difficulty accessing hidden populations, particularly those involved in illicit 
activities. Researchers were ultimately able to access respondents via 
contacts with community leaders, and members of the research team who 
had ties to the community and a pre-existing relationship of trust. In the 
cases of blast fishing and small-boat sampling, lack of a reliable sample 
frame led researchers to use respondent driven survey techniques such 
as snow-ball sampling. While this meant that the results were not 
statistically representative, it did allow researchers to have access to 
populations that are often hidden.  
 Difficulty in interviewing workers while on platforms or vessels, due to the 
presence of supervisors. In the case of blast fishing and small-boat 
fishing, researchers interviewed most fishers away from the worksite to 
gain privacy. In the case of jermals, where workers are on the platform for 
up to three months at a time, former jermal workers were interviewed in 
their home to gain more information about working conditions. 
 General difficulty in accessing work sites. Ports are often in remote towns 
and not easily accessible. Further, as the research team experienced 
when a researcher was knocked over board trying to climb aboard a 
jermal, conditions at sea can be hazardous.  
 Challenge of interviewing mentally disabled workers. As some workers 
were not able to verbally communicate with researchers, researchers 
tracked down the family of one of the disabled workers. The family was 
able to provide background of how that worker had ended up on the 
jermal, as well as some of his experiences there.  
 Challenge of interviewing children. Children were not necessarily able to 
provide accurate information about issues such as debt and payment 
mechanisms or precise information about hours worked. Researchers 
worked to establish rapport with the children and to phrase the questions 
in ways that would be more intuitive for them. For example, if a child had 
difficulty describing his work hours, a researcher could ask if he started 
work when it was light or dark outside? Morning or night? What about 
when he ended? etc. Children were encouraged to respond in their own 
words, which researchers then coded systematically in data sheets.  
 
In general, Verité found that multiple sources of information were needed to triangulate 
findings and provide an accurate, nuanced view. This includes literature review, expert 
consultations with a wide variety of stakeholders, and interviews with workers, 
employers, and other actors.  
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Appendix I: Case Study on Anchovy Workshops 
 
 
Figure 8 - Verite Photo, Workshop workers at night 
 
Researchers, while in North Sumatra researching boat fishing became aware of a large 
number of anchovy workshops. Researchers observed that the labor pool appeared to 
be predominantly female and included children. To provide a fuller picture of labor 
conditions in the anchovy supply chain in North Sumatra, researchers conducted 
interviews with eight female workers ages ten-17.  
 
After anchovies and other small fish are caught on anchovy small boats, they are 
brought to a warehouse or workshops, as the small boats have no sufficient place to 
cook and dry the fish after it is caught. Small boats unload their fish at the dock, where it 
is transported to the workshop.  
 
While anchovy warehouses/workshops were not a focus of this research, the Verité 
research team elected to conduct a small, anecdotal, qualitative assessment of these 
facilities in order to give a fuller picture of the anchovy supply chain and to assess 
whether problematic labor conditions may be present.  
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Researchers directly interviewed eight female workers aged ten to 17, and observed a 
handful of workshops in operation. Located on the main streets of port towns, 
workshops are highly visible, and observation of their activity was relatively 
straightforward.  
 
According to researchers‘ observations, the primary labor pool in the workshops is 
comprised of women and children (mostly girls). Workshop work requires long hours. 
The workers have to quickly sort the fish and process it to avoid decomposition. They 
start work in the afternoon, after the unloaded fish is brought into port by boats. Workers 
are engaged in sorting, boiling, salt processing, and drying. Some larger types of fish 
are stored on ice. Workers generally work throughout the night, although some workers 
who are assigned to drying the fish will work in the morning to afternoon. 
 
Workshop workers interviewed reported being paid on a piece-rate basis; workers 
interviewed received about 750 IDR (.08 USD) per kilogram of sorted fish.  
 
As with children involved directly in fishing, the girls interviewed in the workshops all 
had parents who were involved in the fishing sector and most said there was no other 
job available to them.  
 
 
Case Study – Lastri: Young and Exhausted  
Lastri is a ten-year-old elementary school student. Every day, after school, she 
accompanies her mother to work in an anchovy workshop. The workshop is known as a 
―gudang ikan teri‖ – a place where fresh anchovies are processed into dried fish for 
sale.  
 
Lastri works with other children ranging in age from ten to 17 at the workshop. Of 35 
total workers at the workshop, ten are girls. She knows of other children at other 
workshops in the area as well. Most come from the nearby village, but Lastri has heard 
of some families who come from farther away.  
 
Lastri started working last year when her mother asked for her help to support the 
family. Lastri still goes to school, but when she‘s done, she still has a long day ahead of 
her. After school, she works from 3:00 – 6:00 p.m., takes a break, and then works from 
10:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. She goes home after 1:00 a.m. so she can get some sleep 
before school the next day, but her mother and the other adults (and some of the 
teenagers) keep working until 6:00 a.m. Lastri has noticed that most of the teenage girls 
have stopped going to school.  
 
Lastri is paid like the other workers and earns 750 IDR (.08 USD) per kilogram of fish 
that she cleans. Most days, by working hard, Lastri can average 10,000 to 15,000 IDR 
(1.11 to 1.67 USD) in earnings; while her mother earns 40,000 to 50,000 IDR (4.45 to 
5.56 USD), since she works longer hours. Normally, Lastri and her mother are paid 
daily, but sometimes pay is delayed by a few days if the boss does not have enough 
cash. 
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The floor of the workshop is wet and slippery, so workers have to walk carefully. One 
time, when she was tired and sleepy late at night, Lastri fell and bruised herself. She 
was not badly hurt that time, but it scared her, and she knows she has to be careful. 
Lastri has heard of other workers falling, or getting cut by sharp equipment.  
 
There are many nights that Lastri sleeps at the workshop while she waits for her mother 
to finish working. On those nights, she sleeps in a corner using a net as a bed and 
newspaper scraps as blankets. The air smells strongly of drying fish, but Lastri barely 
notices the smell anymore. Her mother will wake her up the next day for school and she 
starts her work cycle all over again.  
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Appendix II: Legal Review 
 
 
Forced Labor 
 
Indonesian labor law includes an explicit prohibition of forced labor. However, 
compulsory prison labor is allowed by the Criminal Code. According to the ILO, under 
articles 49 and 50 of Law 2/2008, anyone who makes donations to a political party in 
excess of legal limits and members of the executive board of a political party which 
receives donations in excess of legal limits or ―uses the party for adopting, developing, 
and disseminating ‗Communism/Marxism-Leninism‘,‖ may be imprisoned with the 
possibility of compulsory labor.158  
 
The ILO noted that, when read in conjunction, sections 139 and 185 of the Manpower 
Act provide for sanctions of up to four years‘ imprisonment involving compulsory labor 
for striking in enterprises that serve the public interest, which contravenes ILO 
Convention 105.159 
 
The government enacted a comprehensive anti-trafficking law in March 2007 which 
outlaws all forms of trafficking, as well as debt bondage and sexual exploitation. The law 
provides penalties ranging from three to 15 years in prison for government officials and 
labor agents convicted of complicity in such activities.160 
 
 
Child Labor 
 
In April 1999, the Indonesian government established the minimum age for employment 
at 15 years of age. However, the legal definition of childhood is unclear. While the Child 
Protection Law defines children as those under 18, another law sets the age of marriage 
at 16 for females and 19 for males. The Manpower Act prohibits employment of 
―children,‖ defined as persons under 18, but provides that light work is allowed for 
children aged 13 to 15 for no more than three hours per day, as long as they have 
parental consent, do not work during school hours, are paid the legal minimum wage, 
and the job does not stunt or disrupt their physical, mental, and social development.161 
Children 14 years old or older are permitted to hold a job or perform piece work as part 
of their educational curriculum or training, provided that such activity has been approved 
by competent authorities.  
 
Under Decision No. Kep-235/Men/2003, individuals under the age of 18 are prohibited 
from performing work classified as harmful to their health, safety, or morals. Types of 
prohibited work include work involving chemical or biological hazards; work related to 
machines, engines, and other heavy equipment; work at dangerous heights or extreme 
temperatures; work of a typically hazardous nature, such as construction, working on 
ships, or carrying heavy objects; and work considered to be morally harmful to children, 
such as promoting drugs or alcohol or working in places where they are sold.162 In 
addition, the Child Protection Act prohibits the economic exploitation and trafficking of 
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children, and establishes severe criminal penalties, including prison sentences, for the 
violation of children‘s rights.163 
 
 
Conditions of Work 
 
There is no national minimum wage in Indonesia. Provincial authorities establish 
minimum wages that vary by province, district, and sector and are based on proposals 
by tripartite commissions. At the district level, minimum wages are established using 
provincial levels as references, and can vary by sector.164 In 2009, Papua established 
the highest minimum wage, at IDR 1,180,000 (USD 131) per month, while the lowest 
minimum wage was IDR 570,000 (USD 63) per month, in East Java province.165 
 
The Manpower Act of 2003 stipulates that entrepreneurs are prohibited from paying 
wages lower than the minimum wage. However, it allows entrepreneurs who are unable 
to pay minimum wages to postpone the payment of wages. A November 2008 
ministerial decree discourages local government administrations from raising minimum 
wage levels above what manufacturers are capable of paying.166 
 
Indonesian law provides for a 40-hour regular workweek, requiring a 30-minute rest 
period for every four hours worked. The Manpower Act of 2003 exempts certain 
business sectors and types of work from the legal provisions governing regular work 
hours. Overtime must be limited to three hours per day and 14 hours per week. 
Premiums for overtime range from one and a half times the normal hourly rate for the 
first hour of overtime to twice the hourly rate for additional overtime.167 
 
The Manpower Act of 2003 states that all enterprises are obligated to implement an 
―occupational safety and health management system‖ integral to the overall 
management system. Workers are legally required to report hazardous working 
conditions, and employers are legally prohibited from retaliating against workers who file 
grievances.168 However, there is no system established by law or regulation for 
reporting workplace safety problems.  
 
Workers have the legal right to remove themselves from hazardous work environments 
without jeopardizing their employment.169 
 
Although there are no laws in Indonesia that explicitly prohibit workplace sexual 
harassment, the act is punishable under the Criminal Code.170 Indonesian labor law 
states that ―indecent behavior‖ is illegal; and the Criminal Law states that forcing women 
into sexual intercourse outside of marriage or threatening anyone with sexual 
harassment are crimes legally punishable with up to nine to 12 years of imprisonment. 
The ILO has encouraged the government to adopt legislative changes to explicitly 
define and prohibit workplace sexual harassment by ensuring victim protection and 
complaint mechanisms.171 
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Fishing Specific Laws 
Law 45/2009 
 
The Fishing industry is regulated by Law 45/2009. The law regulates all aspects of 
fishing including pre-production, production, processing, and trading. The government 
requires fishing boats and fishing companies to follow the law including, especially, the 
piece on regular inspections. Exception is given to small scale fishermen who fish on 
something smaller than a 5 GT boat. 
 Environmental protection. Article 9 of the law prohibits anyone from possessing, 
carrying, or using any fishing equipment that could endanger the environment 
and sustainability of fishing in the country. This includes blast fishing practiced in 
South Sulawesi.  
 Article 35A requires Indonesian boats that fish in Indonesian waters to use local 
workers, while foreign ships fishing in Indonesian waters are required to employ 
at least 70 percent Indonesian workers.  
 Fishing ports. Article 45(3) says that the government manages all fishing ports 
and requires every fishing boat to engage with certain fishing ports for loading 
and unloading.  
 Fishing inspection. The law requires the government to establish fishing 
inspection procedures. Fishing inspections require civil servant inspectors to 
monitor fishing activities, fishing husbandry, fish processing and distribution, 
fishing product quality, chemical products used for fish farming, conservation, 
pollution, research and study on fishing, biodiversity, and the genetic engineering 
of fish products.  
 Fishing court. Article 71 of the Fishing Law sets up a specialized fishing court to 
investigate, process, and decide upon any violation to the fishing law. The fishing 
court is a special court under the general court. These fishing courts will be 
established in the state district courts of North Jakarta, Medan, Pontianak, 
Bitung, and Tual. The fishing court has authority to investigate and process any 
and all criminal acts in the fishing industry done both by Indonesian or foreign 
citizens in Indonesia territory. 
 
 
Government Regulation on Seamanship (No. 7/2000) 
 
 Article 17 of the Government Regulation sets some requirements for seafarers 
who work on a boat. They need to have attained the working competency 
certificate, be at least 18 years old, be physically and mentally healthy (proven by 
medical exam), possess a seafarer passport issued by the government, and 
have an effective working contract with an employer.  
 Article 21 of the regulation says that working hours for a seafarer are eight hours 
per day or 44 hours per week with one day off weekly, and off days on national 
holidays. Work exceeding those hours should be calculated as overtime. Every 
seafarer should get at least ten hours of rest every day, which can be divided into 
two breaks with one of them lasting no less than 6 hours (except for in 
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emergency situations). Young seafarers aged 16 – 18 years old must not work 
more than eight hours per day and 40 hours per week. The young seafarers are 
also not allowed perform work during their rest time.  
 Every worker is entitled to yearly leave lasting at least 20 days for every year 
worked. Based on employer request, the remaining leave balance can be 
converted into an additional fee. 
 The employer must provide sufficient supplies for the workers on his boat, food 
equalling 3600 calories per worker per day, and enough mineral water, cooking 
equipment, and other necessities. The employer has to provide medical 
treatment for any ill worker and is required to pay the worker‘s salary when he is 
not able to work due to his illness. When a worker becomes sick abroad, the 
employer is also required to provide transportation for his return home.  
 The boat should have sufficient resting place, toilets, and washing areas. There 
should be at least one bathroom for every eight persons on board. There should 
be a medical treatment room for every 15 workers with first aid facilities and 
medicine.  
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Appendix III: Summary of Presence of ILO Indicators of Forced Labor among 
Respondents in Platform (Jermal) Fishing in North Sumatra Province 
 
As discussed in Methodology, Verité analyzed its findings with respect to the indicators 
of forced labor presented in the ILO‘s 2011 publication, Hard to See, Harder to Count: 
Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children. A chart of these 
indicators follows.  
 
  Present 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f u
n
fre
e
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c
ru
itm
e
n
t o
f a
d
u
lts
 
Strong 
Indicators of 
Involuntariness 
 
Tradition, birth 
(birth/descent 
into 'slave' or 
bonded status) 
 
Coercive 
recruitment 
(abduction, 
confinement 
during the 
recruitment 
process) 
 
Sale of the 
worker 
 
Recruitment 
linked to debt 
(advance or 
loan) 
 
Deception about 
the nature of the 
work 
Deception about the nature of the work was reported by 
former workers. However, as current workers return 
repeatedly to the jermals, this may not currently be the case. 
Medium 
Indicators of 
Involuntariness 
 
Deceptive 
recruitment 
(regarding 
working 
conditions, 
content, or 
legality of 
employment 
contract, housing 
and living 
conditions, legal 
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documentation 
or acquisition of 
legal migrant 
status, job 
location or 
employer, 
wages/earnings) 
Deceptive 
recruitment 
through 
promises of 
marriage 
 
Strong 
Indicators of 
Menace of 
Penalty 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of 
identity papers 
or travel 
documents 
 
Sexual violence  
Physical 
violence 
 
Other forms of 
punishment 
 
Removal of 
rights or 
privileges 
(including 
promotion) 
 
Religious 
retribution 
 
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
 
Threats against 
family members 
 
Medium 
Indicators of 
Menace of 
Penalty 
 
Exclusion from 
future 
employment 
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Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
 
Financial 
penalties 
 
Informing family, 
community, or 
public about 
worker's current 
situation 
(blackmail)  
 
 
In
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e
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u
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s
 o
f a
d
u
lts
 
Strong indicators of 
involuntariness 
 
Forced overtime 
(beyond legal limits) 
Workers are often required to work upwards of 18 
hours per day.  
Forced to work on call 
(day and night) 
There is no separation of living and work space and 
workers are often required to work upwards of 18 hours 
per day. 
Limited freedom of 
movement and 
communication 
Limited freedom of movement and communication are 
inherent in physical structure. 
Degrading living 
conditions 
The conditions of jermals are squalid and workers have 
no privacy. This is inherent in physical structure. 
Medium indicators of 
involuntariness 
 
Forced engagement in 
illegal activities 
 
Forced to work for 
employer's private 
home or family 
 
Induced addiction to 
illegal substances 
 
Induced or inflated 
indebtedness (by 
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falsification of 
accounts, inflated 
prices for 
goods/services 
purchased, reduced 
value of 
goods/services 
produced, excessive 
interest rates on loans, 
etc.) 
Multiple dependency 
on employer (jobs for 
relatives, housing, etc.) 
 
Pre-existence of 
dependency 
relationship with 
employer 
 
Being under the 
influence of employer 
or people related to 
employer for non-work 
life.  
 
Strong indicators of 
penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of identity 
papers or travel 
documents 
 
Confiscation of mobile 
phones 
 
Further deterioration in 
working conditions 
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Isolation Geographic isolation is inherent in physical structure of 
jermals.  
Locked in workplace or 
living quarters 
 
Sexual violence  
Physical violence Former workers detailed a high rate of violence. 
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
Workers are deprived of fresh food and water, but this 
is a not a means through which workers are punished 
for not performing specific tasks or otherwise bound to 
their employment.  
Violence against 
worker in front of other 
worker 
 
Removal or rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
 
Religious retribution  
Constant surveillance Due to the small size and layout, workers are under 
constant surveillance.  
Withholding of assets 
(cash or other) 
 
Withholding of wages Workers are paid only at end of three month term. 
Former workers described a system in which workers 
were required to return or provide a replacement before 
they were paid their full wages.  
Threats against family 
members 
 
Medium indicators of 
penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Dismissal  
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Exclusion from future 
employment 
 
Exclusion from 
community and social 
life 
 
Extra work for 
breaching labor 
discipline 
 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's current 
situation (blackmail) 
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 o
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s
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 o
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r fo
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d
u
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Strong indicators of 
involuntariness 
 
Reduced freedom to 
terminate labor contract 
after training or other 
benefit paid by employer 
 
No freedom to resign in 
accordance with legal 
requirements 
 
Forced to stay longer 
than agreed while 
waiting for wages due 
 
Forced to work for 
indeterminate period to 
repay outstanding debt 
or wage advance 
 
Strong indicators of  
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penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of identify 
paper or travel 
documents 
 
Imposition of worse 
working conditions 
 
Locked in work or living 
quarters 
 Geographic isolation is inherent in physical structure of 
jermals. 
Sexual violence  
Physical violence See ‗Work and life under duress.‘ 
Other forms of 
punishment (deprivation 
of food, water, sleep, 
etc.) 
 
Removal of rights or 
benefits (including 
promotion) 
 
Religious retribution  
Under constant 
surveillance 
Supervisors monitor the workers to ensure they do not 
try to escape.  
Violence imposed on 
other workers in front of 
all workers 
 
Withholding of assets 
(cash or other) 
 
Withholding of wages See ‗Work and life under duress.‘  
Threats against family 
members (violence or 
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loss of jobs) 
Medium indicators of 
penalty or menace or 
penalty 
 
Dismissal  
Exclusion from future 
employment 
 
Exclusion from 
community and social 
life 
 
Extra work for breaching 
discipline  
 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's current 
situation (blackmail) 
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Appendix IV: Summary of Presence of ILO Indicators of Forced Labor among 
Respondents in Small-Boat Anchovy Fishing in North Sumatra Province 
 
As discussed in Methodology, Verité analyzed its findings with respect to the indicators 
of forced labor presented in the ILO‘s 2011 publication, Hard to See, Harder to Count: 
Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children. A chart of these 
indicators follows.  
 
Adults 
  Present 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f u
n
fre
e
 re
c
ru
itm
e
n
t o
f a
d
u
lts
 
Strong Indicators 
of Involuntariness 
 
Tradition, birth 
(birth/descent into 
'slave' or bonded 
status) 
 
Coercive 
recruitment 
(abduction, 
confinement during 
the recruitment 
process) 
 
Sale of the worker  
Recruitment linked 
to debt (advance or 
loan) 
 
Deception  about 
the nature of the 
work 
 
  
Medium Indicators 
of Involuntariness 
 
Deceptive 
recruitment 
(regarding working 
conditions, content, 
or legality of 
employment 
contract, housing 
and living 
conditions, legal 
documentation or 
acquisition of legal 
migrant status, job 
location or 
employer, 
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wages/earnings) 
Deceptive 
recruitment through 
promises of 
marriage 
 
  
Strong Indicators 
of Menace of 
Penalty 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of 
identity papers or 
travel documents 
 
Sexual violence  
Physical violence  
Other forms of 
punishment 
 
Removal of rights 
or privileges 
(including 
promotion) 
 
Religious retribution  
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
 
Threats against 
family members 
 
  
Medium Indicators 
of Menace  of 
Penalty 
 
Exclusion from 
future employment 
 
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community, or 
public about 
worker's current 
situation (blackmail)  
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In
d
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a
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rs
 o
f w
o
rk
 a
n
d
 life
 u
n
d
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u
re
s
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 o
f a
d
u
lts
 
Strong indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Forced overtime 
(beyond legal 
limits) 
Due to the seasonal nature of the work, during high 
seasons, workers may work long hours, but this does not 
serve to bind them to their employment.  
Forced to work on 
call (day and night) 
 
Limited freedom of 
movement and 
communication 
Limited freedom of movement while on board, but 
restriction lifted once returned to port. 
Degrading living 
conditions 
 
Medium indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Forced 
engagement in 
illegal activities 
 
Forced to work for 
employer's private 
home or family 
 
Induced addiction 
to illegal 
substances 
 
Induced or inflated 
indebtedness (by 
falsification of 
accounts, inflated 
prices for 
goods/services 
purchased, reduced 
value of 
goods/services 
produced, 
excessive interest 
rates on loans, etc.) 
Workers may take loans in the form of ‗advance‘ 
payment against their wages, leaving them indebted to 
their employer. However, taking these advances is 
voluntary, and the terms are such that the debt is not 
inflated through high interest rates, etc. 
Multiple 
dependency on 
employer (jobs for 
relatives, housing, 
etc.) 
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Pre-existence of 
dependency 
relationship with 
employer 
 
Being under the 
influence of 
employer or people 
related to employer 
for non-work life 
 
Strong indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of 
penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of 
identity papers or 
travel documents 
 
Confiscation of 
mobile phones 
 
Further 
deterioration in 
working conditions 
 
Isolation Isolation is somewhat inherent in the nature of fishing, 
particularly for multi-day trips.  
Locked in 
workplace or living 
quarters 
 
Sexual violence  
Physical violence  
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
 
Violence against 
worker in front of 
other worker 
 
Removal or rights 
or privileges 
(including 
promotion) 
 
Religious retribution  
Constant 
surveillance 
 
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
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other) 
Withholding of 
wages 
Due to the nature of fishing, if there is no catch, fishers 
may not get paid. However, this is an accepted condition 
of the work, and research did not determine that it is 
used to bind workers to their employment. 
Threats against 
family members 
 
Medium indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of 
penalty) 
 
Dismissal  
Exclusion from 
future employment 
 
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
 
Extra work for 
breaching labor 
discipline 
 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community or 
public about 
worker's current 
situation (blackmail) 
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Strong indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Reduced freedom 
to terminate labor 
contract after 
training or other 
benefit paid by 
employer 
 
No freedom to 
resign in 
accordance with 
legal requirements 
 
Forced to stay 
longer than agreed 
while waiting for 
wages due 
 
Forced to work for 
indeterminate 
period to repay 
outstanding debt or 
Because workers may be indebted to the admiral, there 
is room for potential exploitation. However, research did 
not uncover that debt is used to tie workers to their jobs. 
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wage advance 
  
Strong indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of 
penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of 
identify paper or 
travel documents 
 
Imposition of worse 
working conditions 
 
Locked in work or 
living quarters 
 
Sexual violence  
Physical violence  
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
 
Removal of rights 
or benefits 
(including 
promotion) 
 
Religious retribution  
Under constant 
surveillance 
Inherent to fishing industry. While on board a fishing 
vessel, workers are under the surveillance of admirals 
and supervisors. However, this surveillance ends when 
they arrive back at port. 
Violence imposed 
on other workers in 
front of all workers 
 
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
 
Withholding of 
wages 
Please see ‗Work and life under duress.‘ 
Threats against 
family members 
(violence or loss of 
jobs) 
 
  
Medium indicators 
of penalty or 
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menace or penalty 
Dismissal  
Exclusion from 
future employment 
 
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
 
Extra work for 
breaching discipline  
 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community or 
public about 
worker's current 
situation (blackmail) 
 
 
Children 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f u
n
fre
e
 re
c
ru
itm
e
n
t in
 c
h
ild
re
n
 
 Present 
Indicators of involuntariness  
Child is born into a bonded family and is 
forced to work for his or her parents‘ 
employer 
 
Recruitment as collateral for a loan given 
to parents or relatives 
 
Recruitment as part of the employer‘s 
agreement to employ the parents or 
relatives 
 
Recruitment in advance for a cash 
advance or loan to parents 
 
Child sent to work for someone else by a 
previous employer without consent of the 
child or parents 
 
Recruitment of the child in the context of 
a tradition perpetuated by those in power 
 
Child kidnapped, taken by force  
Deception about: access to education, 
living conditions, frequency of visits to or 
by parents, nature of the job, location of 
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the job, employer, wages, quantity of 
work, social benefits 
Indicators of penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Family would lose benefits (land, 
housing, etc).  
 
Other family members would lose their 
job 
 
Exclusion of child from future 
employment 
 
Violence against child  
Violence against family members  
Exclusion of family members from access 
to loans 
 
Isolation Please see ‗Impossibility of 
leaving employer.‘ 
Threats against child or family members  
 
  
 
 
 
W
o
rk
 a
n
d
 life
 u
n
d
e
r d
u
re
s
s
 
Indicators of involuntariness  
Forced overtime Depending on length of trips, 
children may work long hours. 
This appears to be particularly 
true for children who work in 
workshops in the supply chain. 
(Please see Workshop Appendix 
for more details.) 
Forced to work on call (day and night)  
Forced to work for the employers‘ private 
home 
 
Forced to work when sick or injured  
Forced to engage in illicit activities  
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Forced to perform hazardous tasks 
without protection 
 
Forced to take drugs, alcohol, illegal 
substances 
 
Forced to engage in illicit activities  
Forced to engage in sexual acts  
Limited freedom of movement outside the 
workplace 
 
No possibility of leaving the living 
quarters 
 
No freedom to talk to other children or 
adults 
 
No freedom to contact parents, family, 
friends 
 
No possibility of practicing own religion  
Employer decides on matters relating to 
child‘s private life (marriage, education, 
health, religion) 
 
Food, clothing, and housing provided by 
employer in lieu of a wage 
 
Degrading living conditions  
Indicators of Penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
 
Indicators of penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Physical violence There were isolated 
(approximately 1-2 reports) of 
physical violence perpetrated on 
children. 
Psychological violence Children reported verbal 
harassment (yelling and 
scolding) by admirals and 
supervisors.  
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Sexual violence  
Punishment (deprivation of food, water, 
sleep, etc) 
 
Fines  
Wage deductions Like adults, children reported 
that they do can take advance 
wages from the admiral. 
Advances are then deducted 
from earnings.  
Threats of dismissal  
Threats against family  
Punishment/violence inflicted on other 
children in front of child 
 
Locked in living quarters  
Constant surveillance  
Isolation  
Prohibition on contact with parents and 
family members 
 
Retention of identity papers  
Withholding of wages Like adults, children may not be 
paid if there is no fish caught 
during a trip.  
Im
p
o
s
s
ib
ility
 o
f L
e
a
v
in
g
 
E
m
p
lo
y
e
r fo
r C
h
ild
re
n
 
Indicators of involuntariness  
Limited or no freedom to leave employer  
Indicators of penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Isolation Like adults, while children are 
onboard a vessel, they do not  
have an opportunity to leave.  
Confinement  
Under constant surveillance While onboard vessel, children 
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are under constant surveillance. 
Family would lose benefits (land, 
housing, etc.) 
 
Exclusion from future employment  
Exclusion of family members from future 
employment 
 
Threats or violence against child  
Threats or violence against family 
members 
 
Exclusion of family members from access 
to loans 
 
Punishment (deprivation of food, water, 
sleep, etc) 
 
Withholding of wages See indicator under ‗work and 
life under duress.‘  
Unfulfilled promises of education, 
vocational training, etc 
 
Threat of denunciation to authorities  
Confiscation of identity papers  
Punishment inflicted on child in front of 
other children 
 
Threat of further deterioration of working 
conditions 
 
Threat of forced commercial exploitation  
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Appendix V: Summary of Presence of ILO Indicators of Forced Labor among 
Respondents in Blast Fishing in South Sulawesi Province 
 
As discussed in Methodology, Verité analyzed its findings with respect to the indicators 
of forced labor presented in the ILO‘s 2011 publication, Hard to See, Harder to Count: 
Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children. A chart of these 
indicators follows.  
 
Adults 
  Present  
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f u
n
-fre
e
 re
c
ru
itm
e
n
t o
f a
d
u
lts
 
Strong Indicators of 
Involuntariness 
 
Tradition, birth 
(birth/descent into 
'slave' or bonded 
status) 
 
Coercive recruitment 
(abduction, 
confinement during 
the recruitment 
process) 
 
Sale of the worker  
Recruitment linked to 
debt (advance or 
loan) 
 
Deception about the 
nature of the work 
 
  
Medium Indicators 
of Involuntariness 
 
Deceptive recruitment 
(regarding working 
conditions, content, or 
legality of employment 
contract, housing and 
living conditions, legal 
documentation or 
acquisition of legal 
migrant status, job 
location or employer, 
wages/earnings) 
 
Deceptive recruitment 
through promises of 
marriage 
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Strong Indicators of 
Menace of Penalty 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of 
identity papers or 
travel documents 
 
Sexual violence  
Physical violence  
Other forms of 
punishment 
 
Removal of rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
 
Religious retribution  
Withholding of assets 
(cash or other) 
 
Threats against family 
members 
 
  
Medium Indicators 
of Menace of Penalty 
 
Exclusion from future 
employment 
 
Exclusion from 
community and social 
life 
 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community, or public 
about worker's current 
situation (blackmail)  
 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f w
o
rk
 a
n
d
 life
 
u
n
d
e
r d
u
re
s
s
 o
f a
d
u
lts
 
Strong indicators of 
involuntariness   
 
Forced overtime 
(beyond legal limits) 
While fishers may work long hours on some fishing 
voyages, this is not used as a means to bind them to 
their job. 
Forced to work on call 
(day and night) 
 
Limited freedom of 
movement and 
communication 
 
Degrading living 
conditions 
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Medium indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Forced engagement 
in illegal activities 
Blast fishing is a de facto illegal activity, however, 
participation is not forced, and is not used to bind 
workers to their jobs.  
Forced to work for 
employer's private 
home or family 
 
Induced addiction to 
illegal substances 
 
Induced or inflated 
indebtedness (by 
falsification of 
accounts, inflated 
prices for 
goods/services 
purchased, reduced 
value of 
goods/services 
produced, excessive 
interest rates on 
loans, etc.) 
Workers may borrow money from juragang and in fact, 
juragangs may be the only accessible source of capital 
within a community. However, research did not 
determine that juragangs exploited this debt to entrap 
workers.  
Multiple dependency 
on employer (jobs for 
relatives, housing, 
etc.) 
 
Pre-existence of 
dependency 
relationship with 
employer 
Juragangs act as community leaders and provide loans 
and capital. 
Being under the 
influence of employer 
or people related to 
employer for non-work 
life.  
 
Strong indicators of 
penalty (or menace 
of penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of 
identity papers or 
travel documents 
 
Confiscation of mobile 
phones 
 
Further deterioration  
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in working conditions 
Isolation  
Locked in workplace 
or living quarters 
 
Sexual violence  
Physical violence *Please see Indicators of Forced Child Labor Chart. 
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
 
Violence against 
worker in front of 
other worker 
 
Removal or rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
 
Religious retribution  
Constant surveillance  
Withholding of assets 
(cash or other) 
 
Withholding of wages  
Threats against family 
members 
 
Medium indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of penalty) 
 
Dismissal  
Exclusion from future 
employment 
 
Exclusion from 
community and social 
life 
Please see ‗Pre-existence of dependency on employer‘ 
in ‗Work and life under duress.‘  
Extra work for 
breaching labor 
discipline 
 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's current 
situation (blackmail) 
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Strong indicators of 
involuntariness 
 
Reduced freedom to 
terminate labor 
contract after training 
or other benefit paid 
by employer 
 
No freedom to resign 
in accordance with 
legal requirements 
 
Forced to stay longer 
than agreed while 
waiting for wages due 
 
Forced to work for 
indeterminate period 
to repay outstanding 
debt or wage advance 
 
Strong indicators of 
penalty (or menace 
of penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
 
Confiscation of 
identify paper or travel 
documents 
 
Imposition of worse 
working conditions 
 
Locked in work or 
living quarters 
 
Sexual violence  
Physical violence  
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
 
Removal of rights or 
benefits (including 
promotion) 
 
Religious retribution  
Under constant 
surveillance 
 
Violence imposed on 
other workers in front 
of all workers 
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Withholding of assets 
(cash or other) 
 
Withholding of wages  
Threats against family 
members (violence or 
loss of jobs) 
 
Medium indicators 
of penalty or 
menace or penalty 
 
Dismissal  
Exclusion from future 
employment 
 
Exclusion from 
community and social 
life 
 
Extra work for 
breaching discipline  
 
Financial penalties  
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's current 
situation (blackmail) 
 
 
Children 
  Present 
 
  
In
d
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a
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f u
n
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e
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c
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e
n
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 c
h
ild
re
n
 
Indicators of involuntariness  
Child is born into a bonded family and 
is forced to work for his or her parents‘ 
employer 
It may be culturally expected that 
children work for their parents‘ 
juragang, but researchers did not 
determine that children were 
forced to do so.  
Recruitment as collateral for a loan 
given to parents or relatives 
 
Recruitment as part of the employer‘s 
agreement to employ the parents or 
relatives 
 
Recruitment in advance for a cash 
advance or loan to parents 
 
Child sent to work for someone else 
by a previous employer without 
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consent of the child or parents 
Recruitment of the child in the context 
of a tradition perpetuated by those in 
power 
Juragangs are traditionally the 
powerful individuals within the 
community, but researchers did 
not determine that children are 
compelled to work by force.  
Child kidnapped, taken by force  
Deception about: access to education, 
living conditions, frequency of visits to 
or by parents, nature of the job, 
location of the job, employer, wages, 
quantity of work, social benefits 
 
Indicators of penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Family would lose benefits (land, 
housing, etc).  
Families may have multiple levels 
of dependency on their juragang. 
However, researchers did not find 
evidence that this compels 
children to work.  
Other family members would lose their 
job 
 
Exclusion of child from future 
employment 
 
Violence against child  
Violence against family members  
Exclusion of family members from 
access to loans 
 
Isolation Please see ‗Impossibility of 
leaving employer.‘ 
Threats against child or family 
members 
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Indicators of involuntariness  
Forced overtime Depending on length of trips, 
children may work long hours. 
This appears to be particularly 
true for children who work in 
workshops in the supply chain.  
Forced to work on call (day and night)  
Forced to work for the employers‘ 
private home 
 
Forced to work when sick or injured  
Forced to engage in illicit activities  
Forced to perform hazardous tasks 
without protection 
 
Forced to take drugs, alcohol, illegal 
substances 
 
Forced to engage in illicit activities  
Forced to engage in sexual acts  
Limited freedom of movement outside 
the workplace 
 
No possibility of leaving the living 
quarters 
 
No freedom to talk to other children or 
adults 
 
No freedom to contact parents, family, 
friends 
 
No possibility of practicing own religion  
Employer decides on matters relating 
to child‘s private life (marriage, 
education, health, religion) 
 
Food, clothing, and housing provided 
by employer in lieu of a wage 
 
Degrading living conditions  
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Indicators of Penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
 
Indicators of penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Physical violence Children reported witnessing and 
experience physical violence such 
as slapping as punishment.  
Psychological violence Children reported verbal 
harassment (yelling and scolding) 
by supervisors. 
Sexual violence  
Punishment (deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc) 
 
Fines  
Wage deductions Like adults, children reported that 
they do can take small loans from 
the juragang. This does not 
appear to bind them to work.  
Threats of dismissal  
Threats against family  
Punishment/violence inflicted on other 
children in front of child 
See ‗Physical violence.‘  
Locked in living quarters  
Constant surveillance  
Isolation  
Prohibition on contact with parents 
and family members 
 
Retention of identity papers  
Withholding of wages Like adults, children may not be 
paid if there is no fish caught 
during a trip.  
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Indicators of involuntariness  
Limited or no freedom to leave 
employer 
 
Indicators of penalty (or menace of 
penalty) 
 
Isolation Like adults, while children are 
onboard a vessel, they do not 
have an opportunity to leave.  
Confinement  
Under constant surveillance While onboard a vessel, children 
are under constant surveillance. 
Family would lose benefits (land, 
housing, etc.) 
 
Exclusion from future employment  
Exclusion of family members from 
future employment 
 
Threats or violence against child  
Threats or violence against family 
members 
 
Exclusion of family members from 
access to loans 
 
Punishment (deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc) 
 
Withholding of wages See indicator under ‗Work and life 
under duress.‘  
Unfulfilled promises of education, 
vocational training, etc 
 
Threat of denunciation to authorities  
Confiscation of identity papers  
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Punishment inflicted on child in front of 
other children 
 
Threat of further deterioration of 
working conditions 
 
Threat of forced commercial 
exploitation 
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Appendix VI: Survey Tools 
 
*Note that these were guide questions. Exact phrasing of questions may change 
depending on the context. 
Jermal - Current Worker  
1. Demographics 
a. How old are you? 
b. What village are you from? 
c. How much education do you have? 
d. Ethnicity? 
2. Recruitment/Entry into Sector 
a. How long have you been working here?  
b. Did someone recruit you? Who? 
c. Do you have previous work experience? 
d. Do you plan to stay on the jermal? 
3. Wages 
a. What is your monthly salary? 
4. Health and Safety 
a. Do/Have you experienced illness because of your work? What? 
b. Do/Have you experienced injury because of your work? 
For interviewer: 
1. Did this worker appear? 
a. Shy 
b. Hesitant 
c. Closed  
d. Curious  
e. Physically injured? (i.e. bruising) 
2. Were you able to interview worker away from supervisor? 
Jermal - Supervisor  
1. Demographics 
a. How old are you? 
b. How much education do you have? 
c. What is your ethnicity? 
d. What village are you from? 
2. Entry 
a. How long have you worked on jermals? 
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b. Do you have other work experience? 
c. How did you get this job? 
d. Why do you do this work? 
e. Are there things you don‘t like about this work? 
3. Wages 
a. How much are you paid? 
b. Do you receive a bonus? 
4. Other 
a. What would you do if a worker got sick? 
b. What would you do if a worker wanted to leave? 
c. How do you get to the jermal? Transportation 
For the interviewer 
1. Describe the supervisor’s attitude. Is he: 
a. Curious 
b. Uncomfortable 
c. Open 
d. Closed 
Researcher observation: 
- How many hours did it take to get to the jermal? 
- Describe the structure of the jermal 
o Condition of roof, base, logs, etc 
o Does the jermal appear stable? 
- Are there bathrooms? 
- Sleeping areas? 
- What foods are kept on board? How much? 
- How much fresh water is available? 
- Are first aid materials available? 
- Are life vests available?  
- Are communication devices available?  
Jermal -  Former Worker  
1. Demographics 
a. How old are you? 
b. What village are you from?  
c. What year did you start work (on jermal)? 
d. How old were you when you started work? 
e. How long did you stay on jermals? 
2. Entry into Sector/Recruitment 
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a. Did somebody recruit you? 
i. If so, who? 
ii. What was your relationship to that person? 
b. Did you have previous experience? 
c. Were other friends/children from your village on the jermal with you? 
d. Did you have any information about jermal conditions before you started? 
i. Was that information correct? 
ii. Did anything surprise you when you arrived on the jermal? 
e. Did your parents receive money from your recruiter? 
3. Wages 
a. How much were you paid? How did payment mechanisms work? 
b. Did you have information about salary before you started? 
i. Was that information correct? 
c. When were you paid/on what schedule? 
i. Why did the supervisors pay workers on that schedule? 
d. Were there deductions from your wages? 
i. How much? 
ii. For what? 
iii. Did you understand the deduction system? 
e. Did you ever not receive your wages? 
4. Hours 
a. How much did you work on a normal day? 
b. What were work patterns like? (seasons, tides, etc) 
c. How much time to rest did you have most days? 
d. Did you get holidays? 
5. Abuse and Harassment 
a. Were you ever verbally scolded/yelled at? 
i. Why? 
b. Were you ever punished in another way? 
i. What happened? 
c. Did you ever experience sexual abuse? 
i. Did anyone you know experience this? 
6. Ability to terminate 
a. Were you able to leave when you wanted? 
b. Did you ever try to leave/escape? 
i. Why? 
ii. How? 
iii. Were you successful? 
c. Did anyone else you know try to escape? 
i. Why? 
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ii. How?  
iii. Was he successful? 
For interviewer: 
7. Did this worker appear? 
a. Shy 
b. Hesitant 
c. Closed  
d. Curious  
e. Physically injured? (i.e. bruising) 
2. Where did the interview take place? 
 
Small-Boat Fishing - Adult 
1. Demographics 
a. Where are you from? 
b. How old are you? 
c. Are you married? 
d. Do you have children? 
e. How much education have you completed? 
2. Entry into Sector/Recruitment 
a. How long have you been fishing? 
b. Have you tried other jobs? 
i. What? 
c. How did you get this job? 
d. Why did you decide to take this job? 
e. Do your friends/family members also do this job? 
f. Did you have other choices in choosing a job? 
g. Do people need any special qualifications/skill to be a fisher? 
h. Do you have your own boat? 
i. Do you have to pay fees to your boss? 
3. Hours 
a. How long are fishing journeys? 
b. How often? 
c. Describe seasonality. 
4. Health and Safety 
a. Do you have any fears? 
b. Concerns? 
c. Injuries/Illness? 
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5. Abuse and Harassment 
a. Have you or your family ever been threatened? 
6. Debt 
a. Do you borrow money? 
i. From who? 
ii. Currently in debt? 
1. How much? 
iii. How do you decide who to borrow from? 
iv. Do you have a choice? Another option to borrow money from? 
v. (If you borrow from boss), does he suggest it? 
vi. For what?/why? 
vii. In cash/other? 
viii. Is there interest? 
ix. Do you provide collateral? 
x. Is there a written agreement? 
xi. Is there a time limit? 
1. What happens if you don‘t pay back in time? 
2. What if you stopped paying before paying back all of the debt? 
xii. How do you repay? 
xiii. Do you regularly pay off debt or are you usually in debt? 
7. Ability to leave employer/terminate employment 
a. What would happen if you moved to another boss? 
Small-Boat Fishing – Child 
1. Demographics 
a. How old are you? 
b. What village are you from? 
c. How much school have you completed? 
d. Do you have a specific job? (Do you work on the boats? In the 
workshops? What do you do?) 
2. Recruitment/Entry into Sector 
b. When did you start? 
c. How long have you been doing this job? 
d. Do your parents also work in this job? 
i. How many generations before have worked in this job? 
e. Do you hope that YOUR children do this job? 
i. Why/why not? 
f. Did someone recruit you? 
i. Who 
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g. Did your parents receive money when you were recruited? Was there 
another agreement or relationship? Between your parents and the 
recruiter? 
h. Did you have information about this job before you started? 
i. Was this information correct? 
i. Are wages paid as you were first promised? 
j. Is your parent a fisherman? 
4. Health and Safety 
a. Do you ever feel afraid? 
i. Why? 
b. Do you think your job is safe? 
c. Have you ever been injured/in an accident? 
5. Ability to Leave Employer 
a. Could you leave if you wanted to? 
i. Why/why not? 
b. Have any of your friends left? 
i. Why? 
ii. What happened to him?  
c. Do you want to leave? 
i. Why/why not? 
6. Hours 
a. How many hours do you work per day? 
b. How many days per week? 
c. Seasonality? 
d. Do you get days off? 
7. Harassment and Abuse 
a. Have you ever been scolded/yelled at? 
i. Why? 
b. Have you ever been punished/disciplined in another way? (hit?) 
i. Why? 
ii. What happened? 
c. Have you or anyone you know experienced sexual harassment? 
8. Wages 
a. How much are you paid? How do your payments/wages work? 
b. Are any deductions taken? 
i. For what? 
ii. How much? 
iii. Was deduction agreed on? 
c. Have your wages ever been withheld? 
d. Why? 
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9. Debt 
a. Do you owe any money? 
i. How much? 
ii. To who? 
iii. Why do you take loans? 
iv. How do you repay your debt? 
v. What happens if someone doesn‘t repay debt? 
Blast Fishing – Adult 
1. Demographics 
a. How old are you? 
b. What village are you from? 
c. Are you married? 
d. Do you have children? 
e. How much education do you have? 
2. Entry into Sector/Recruitment 
a. How long have you worked in this sector? 
b. Have you always been a fisherman/Any previous work experience? 
c. How did you get this job? 
d. What made you want this job? 
e. Do other friends/family work in this kind of fishing? 
f. Why do you do this job?  
g. Would you want your children to do this work? 
h. Are there any special requirements you need to do this work?  
3. Wages/Deductions 
a. Do you have to pay any fees? 
b. Who owns the boat? 
c. How much do you earn? 
d. How often are you paid? 
4. Hours 
a. How many hours do you work in a normal day? 
b. How many days a week? 
c. Describe seasonality.  
5. Debt 
a. Do you borrow money? 
i. From whom? 
ii. How much is your debt? 
iii. Do you borrow cash or other goods (i.e. food) 
iv. Why do you borrow?  
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v. How did you decide to borrow from this person? Did your boss 
suggest that you borrow money? (if debt is to boss) 
vi. Are there other options? 
vii. How much is the interest? 
viii. How do you pay it back? 
ix. After you pay back your debt, do you still receive a salary? (Or are 
you always working only to pay off previous debt?) 
x. Did you have to put up collateral when you took out the loan? 
xi. Is there a loan duration? 
6. Ability to Leave Employer/Terminate Employment 
a. If you were to leave, how would your boss react? 
b. Are you aware of any situations where a worker left without repaying his 
debt? 
i. What happened? 
c. Are you afraid of anything? 
d. Have you/your family ever been threatened? 
i. By who? 
ii. Details of threat? 
e. When you‘re on board, can you go back to the mainland? 
Blast Fishing – Child 
1. Demographics 
a. How old are you? 
b. What village are you from? 
c. What was the last grade/level of school you finished? 
d. Are you assigned any specific tasks?/What‘s your job on the boat? 
2. Recruitment/Entry into Sector 
a. When did you start? 
b. How long have you been doing this job? 
c. Do your parents also work in this job? 
i. How many generations before have worked in this job? 
d. Do you hope that YOUR children do this job? 
i. Why/why not? 
e. Did someone recruit you? 
i. Who 
f. Did your parents receive money when you were recruited? Was there 
another agreement or relationship? Between your parents and the 
recruiter? 
g. Did you have information about this job before you started? 
h. Was this information correct? 
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i. Are wages paid as you were first promised? 
3. Health and Safety 
a. Do you have any fears about your job? 
i. What? 
b. Do you think your job is safe? 
c. Have you ever experienced an accident? 
d. Have you been injured? 
e. Do you know of anyone who has been paralyzed? 
4. Hours 
a. How many hours do you work on a normal day? 
b. How many days a week do you work? 
c. Describe seasonality. 
5. Harassment and Abuse 
a. Have you ever been scolded/yelled at? 
i. Why? 
b. Have you ever been punished/disciplined in another way? (hit?) 
i. Why? 
ii. What happened? 
c. Have you or anyone you know experienced sexual harassment? 
6. Wages? 
a. How much do you get paid? How does you salary/earning work? 
b. Are there any deductions from your pay? 
i. How much? 
ii. Do you know what that money was deducted for? 
iii. Was that agreed to in advance? 
c. Do you ever not receive your wages when you‘re supposed to?  
7. Ability to Leave Employer? 
a. Could you leave if you wanted to? 
i. Why/why not? 
b. Have any of your friends left? 
i. Why? 
ii. What happened to him?  
c. Do you want to leave? 
i. Why/why not? 
8. Debt 
a. Do you owe any money? 
i. How much? 
ii. To who? 
iii. How do you repay your debt? 
iv. Is someone‘s debt passed down to their kin (i.e. if they die)? 
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QUESTION FOR INTERVIEWER  
Did you have difficulty in interviewing the informant? Why? 
What is your general impression of the reliability of the informant?  
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